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ARTICLES
A THEORY OF SELF-ENFORCING
INDEFINITE AGREEMENTS
Robert E. Scott*
One of the core principles of contract law is the requirement of definiteness. Conventional wisdom holds, however, that the indefiniteness doctrine
is largely ignored by courts. In this Article, Professor Scott examines the contemporary case law on indefinite contracts and his review yields three striking
findings. First, there is a surprisingly high volume of litigation. Second, the
indefiniteness doctrine lives on in the common law of contracts. Third, a
large number of the indefiniteness cases involve contracts that are "deliberately" incomplete-that is, parties have declined to conditionperformance on
available, verifiable measures that could be specified in the contract at relatively low cost. These findings raise a fundamental question: Why do parties write deliberately incomplete agreements in the shadow of a robust indefiniteness doctrine? One answer is that these agreements may be self-enforcing.
But most of the recently litigated cases involve contracts that do not appear to
be self-enforcing in the traditional sense. A second answer is indicated by
recent work in experimental economics, which suggests that roughly half the
population behave as if reciprocity were an important motivation, while the
other half react as if motivated entirely by self-interest. This evidence of a
taste for "reciprocalfairness" in nearly half the population, argues Professor
Scott, may expand the domain of self-enforcing contracts beyond what is conventionally understood. It may also support a theory that predicts that deliberately incomplete contracts that rely on self-enforcement through reciprocal
fairness between strangers are more efficient than the alternativeof more complete, legally enforceable agreements.
INTRODUCTION

All contracts are incomplete. There are infinite states of the world
and the capacities of contracting parties to condition their future performance on each possible state are finite. I But incomplete contracts dif* David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor, University of Virginia School of
Law; Justin W. D'Atri Visiting Professor of Law, Business and Society, Columbia Law
School. I am grateful to Marvin Chirelstein, Clay Gillette, Victor Goldberg, John Jeffries,
Tom Nachbar, Alan Schwartz, Paul Stephan, Bill Stuntz, George Triantis, and Rip Verkerke
for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Kent Olson provided valuable research
assistance. I also thank the participants at faculty workshops at the Columbia and
Pennsylvania Law Schools.
1. Both transaction costs, broadly defined, and information asymmetries are
formidable barriers to writing complete contingent contracts. For discussion, see Robert
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fer along key dimensions. Many contracts are incomplete because parties
decline to condition performance on uncertain future states that they
cannot observe or verify to courts.2 In these cases, incompleteness is exogenous to the contract; that is, the parties are incapable of contracting
efficiently over measures of performance that cannot be verified." Other
agreements, however, appear to be "deliberately" incomplete, in the
sense that parties decline to condition performance on available, verifiable measures that could be specified in the contract at relatively low cost.
Thus, incompleteness is endogenous to these agreements, suggesting that
the parties had other reasons for leaving the terms in question
4
unspecified.
E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847, 862-64
(2000).
2. The distinction between observable and verifiable information is analytically
important in information economics, but both concepts remain somewhat imprecise.
According to standard economic theory, a datum of information is "unobservable" if the
other contracting party cannot perceive it. Buyers, for example, ordinarily cannot observe
a seller's production cost. A datum of information is "observable but not verifiable" if the
other party can perceive it, but cannot prove the fact to a court or other third party at an
acceptable cost. For example, an employer usually can know which employees sometimes
shirk, but it would be expensive relative to the gains to prove to a court that a particular
employee shirked 20% of the time. A datum of information thus is "verifiable" if a party
both can observe it and prove its existence to a third party. Alan Schwartz & Robert E.
Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. (forthcoming Dec.
2003). Legal scholars understand, of course, that what can and cannot be proved to a
court is often a function of factors other than the cost of producing evidence. See infra
note 57.
3. Under modern law, open term or relational contracts (where incompleteness is a
function of factors exogenous to the contract) are routinely enforced by courts. There is a
rich literature analyzing the optimal contractual response to uncertainty and
environmental complexity in these ongoing relationships. A number of scholars have
argued that parties write such contracts when uncertainty makes it costly to negotiate fixedperformance terms or because open term contracts respond better to problems of moral
hazard. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 Colum. L. Rev.
997, 1007-09 (1992) (moral hazard concerns and alignment of individual and joint
contract risks support use of open contract terms); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (1981) (complexity and
uncertainty of future events motivate use of open contract terms); Victor P. Goldberg,
Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 527, 531-33 (discussing utility
of open contract terms in preservingjoint profits); Victor P. Goldberg &John R. Erickson,
Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke,
30 J.L. & Econ. 369, 370 (1987) (open contract terms reflect party comprehension
problems and information generation costs); Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and the
Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 4J.L. Econ. & Org. 95, 101 (1988)
(explaining incomplete contracts in terms of asset specificity and uncertainty). All of these
various explanations turn, at bottom, on the fact that the relevant measures of
performance are too costly to specify or are not verifiable. In this Article, I put this
category of contract aside and focus on agreements where the parties have declined to
condition performance on verifiable measures that were available at low cost.
4. Among the reasons for leaving verifiable terms unspecified are high transaction
costs, inadvertence, or, as I suggest in this paper, an intent to use self-enforcing
mechanisms such as reciprocity. For discussion see George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of
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These deliberately incomplete agreements are unenforceable under
traditional contracts doctrine. One of the core principles of contract law
is the requirement of definiteness. An agreement will not be enforced as
a contract if it is uncertain and indefinite in its material terms. 5 A contract, that is, must be sufficiently complete such that a court is able to
determine the fact of breach and provide an appropriate remedy. Only
then does the doctrine direct courts to enforce the agreement by filling
contractual gaps where necessary. 6 Otherwise, the doctrine directs courts
to deny enforcement and leave the losses to lie where they fall. 7 It is
widely believed, however, that the indefiniteness doctrine is largely ignored by contemporary courts. Conventional wisdom holds that courts
should (and do) strive whenever possible to fill contractual gaps with general standards of reasonableness and good faith.8
But the conventional wisdom is misleading. A study of the contemporary case law on indefinite contracts, which I undertake here, reveals
some striking facts. First, there is a surprisingly high volume of litigation.
Second, despite the perceived influence of the Uniform Commercial
Code and despite widespread academic support for more judicial gapVague Contract Terms: A Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2, 62
La. L. Rev. 1065, 1071-72 (2002). The argument advanced in this Article-that courts can
(and do) make judgments about how aggressively to fill contractual gaps based on the
reasons why the agreement is incomplete-is similar in some respects to the argument
advanced by Eggleston, Posner, and Zeckhauser that courts should interpret simple
contracts either strictly or liberally based on the reasons for contractual simplicity. See
Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation of
Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 91, 126-32 (2000).
5. See, e.g.,Joseph Martin,Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543
(N.Y. 1981); Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 824 (N.Y. 1916); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 33 (1981); Restatement of Contracts § 32 (1932); 1 Samuel Williston, A
Treatise on the Law of Contracts §§ 37-49 (Walter H. E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1957).
6. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2002); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra note 5,
§ 33(2). For a discussion of the differences between the common law and Uniform
Commercial Code approaches to uncertainty, see infra notes 21-36 and accompanying
text.
7. This general proposition is qualified to the extent that the agreement has been
partially executed by the promisee. In that case, general principles of restitution may
support a recovery on the basis of quantum meruit. See Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, supra note 5, § 34(3) cmt. d. Moreover, a few courts have granted relief on the
basis of promissory estoppel where the facts show a specific inducement by the promisor.
See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. 1965).
8. See, e.g., 1 Arthur Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 95, at 400 (1963) ("[T]he court
should not frustrate [the parties'] intentions if it is possible to reach a fair and just result,
even though this requires a choice among conflicting meanings and the filling of some
gaps that the parties have left."); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra note 5,
§ 33 cmt. a; cases cited infra note 36. In essence, the disagreement between the common
law and contemporary approaches concerns which presumption should govern in cases of
incompleteness. Everyone agrees that the evidence must support a finding that the
promisor intended to be bound. The disagreement concerns just how proactive a court
should be in supplying terms the absence of which would preclude giving a remedy. See
infra text accompanying notes 30-33.

1644

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:1641

filling, the indefiniteness doctrine lives on in the common law of contracts. In literally dozens of cases, American courts dismiss claims for
breach of contract on the grounds of indefiniteness, often without granting any relief to the disappointed promisee. 9
This evidence raises a fundamental question: Why do parties write
deliberately incomplete agreements in the shadow of a robust indefiniteness doctrine? One answer is that parties may simply be ignorant of the
distinction between unenforceable incomplete agreements and enforceable open term contracts. Another answer is that these agreements may be
self-enforcing. If the parties themselves can create efficient extralegal
mechanisms for coping with problems of hidden action and hidden information, then they will be indifferent to legal enforcement. Scholars have
long understood that reputation and the discipline of repeated interactions are efficient means of self-enforcement."' But these conditions for
self-enforcement are stringent. Reputations work best in markets for homogeneous goods or in ethnically homogeneous communities,' 1 and parties in ongoing relationships face end-game dilemmas.1 2 Indeed, most of
the recently litigated cases do not appear to be self-enforcing in the traditional sense. Rather, most are isolated transactions in heterogeneous
markets between strangers trading at arm's length.' 3
Recent work in experimental economics suggests, however, that the
domain of self-enforcing contracts may be considerably larger than has
been conventionally understood. A robust result of these experiments is
that a significant fraction of individuals behave as if reciprocity were an
important motivation (even in isolated interactions with strangers), while
a comparable fraction react as if motivated entirely by self-interest. The
evidence that in any population roughly half behave fairly and half behave selfishly provides the foundation for a theory of fairness grounded
in the human motivation to reciprocate.' 4 Reciprocity requires no enforcement costs and also permits parties to contract over nonverifiable
measures of performance. Thus, this theory predicts that self-enforcement of deliberately incomplete agreements between strangers is more
9. See cases collected infra table 2. The frequency of dismissals on the grounds of
indefiniteness is inconsistent with conventional assumptions, but the failure to grant relief
in the face of claims of reliance is even more striking. See infra note 48.
10. See Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of
Contractual Relationships, 34 Econ. Inquiry 444, 449-50 (1996); Robert E. Scott, Conflict
and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 2005, 2039-49 (1987)
[hereinafter Scott, Conflict and Cooperation].
11. See Janet Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An
Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10J. Legal Stud. 349, 359-61 (1981) (suggesting
that ethnic characteristics are low cost screening devices).
12. For discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 16-18.
13. See infra note 88.
14. These experiments do not show that individuals have an intrinsic motivation to be
fair. Rather they show that individuals engage in voluntary cooperation in contexts where
pure self-interest would dictate noncooperative actions. The source of this behavior
remains an open question. See infra text accompanying notes 104-112.
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efficient than the alternative of more complete, legally enforceable
contracts.
A theory of reciprocal fairness also provides a fresh explanation for
the prevalence of informal agreements to agree despite judicial decisions
denying enforcement of such agreements. These "comfort agreements"
can be understood as a means of screening potential trading partners by
which the parties gain valuable information about each other's preferences for reciprocity. In addition, the potency of reciprocal fairness as a
method of self-enforcement explains (and justifies) the resilience of the
common law indefiniteness doctrine in the face of a contemporary academic consensus favoring the expansion of legal liability. The experimental evidence suggests that transforming an informal, indefinite agreement into a legally binding obligation is often counterproductive; legal
liability can increase moral hazard and it may also "crowd out" the parties' self-enforcing mechanisms.
In this Article I argue that the observed preference for reciprocal
fairness offers the best available solution to the puzzle of deliberately incomplete agreements. Part I begins the analysis by evaluating the large
and hitherto unexamined body of cases where courts decline to enforce
agreements on the grounds of indefiniteness. In many of these cases the
parties appear to discard verifiable information that they might have used
to write more complete, legally enforceable contracts. Part II evaluates
recent experimental evidence supporting a theory of reciprocal fairness,
a theory that greatly expands the domain of self-enforcing agreements.
Part III then turns to the central questions underlying the legal regulation of indefinite agreements: Why do parties write intentionally indefinite agreements? And can the courts' refusal to enforce these agreements be justified?
I conclude that the robust experimental evidence of self-enforcing
reciprocity undermines the conventional assumption that both fairness
and efficiency are best served by expanding the domain of contractual
liability. The error in the conventional analysis has been the instinct to
generalize from those instances where self-enforcement has broken
down. But the occasional failure of self-enforcement provides little guidance for how the law should treat the far greater number of instances
where reciprocity may well be the more efficient mechanism for making
credible promises. Fairness theory better explains the behavior of contracting parties as well as the durability of the indefiniteness doctrine
which, by narrowing the domain of legal liability, preserves space for parties to exploit opportunities to reciprocate.
I.

RETHINKING THE LAW OF INDEFINITE CONTRACTS

The first objective of contract law is to resolve a basic sorting problem. Our legal system does not enforce all promises, even those that were
seriously intended. Thus, a normative theory of contract law must explain why certain bargained-for promises deserve a presumption of en-
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forceability in the first place. One response is that the freedom to exchange entitlements presupposes the freedom to contract for such an
exchange. Both freedoms are supported by norms of autonomy and efficiency. Parties who are denied either the freedom to contract or the freedom to exchange entitlements suffer unnecessary constraints on their
choices, constraints that undermine the value of the entitlements themselves. Thus, the normative claim is that the law, by standing behind a
present promise to exchange entitlements in the future, offers individuals
more choices than they would otherwise enjoy and, other things being
5
equal, more choice is better than less.'
But this argument assumes too much. It assumes, for example, that
promises are not credible absent legal enforcement. Yet we know that
contracts often are performed even in the absence of any legal sanctions
for breach. Contracts may be "self-enforcing" in two senses. 16 First,
where parties contemplate repeated interactions, neither party will
breach an agreement if the expected gains from breaching are less than
the expected returns from future transactions that breach would sacrifice. Second, neither party will breach if the reputational costs of a broken promise are greater than the gains from breaching. Both of these
familiar mechanisms for self-enforcement suffer from significant constraints, however. Ongoing relationships inevitably come to an end and
thus all repeated interactions are subject to a familiar end-game problem.
Indeed, in the limiting case, the anticipation of the last transaction may
cause the entire cooperative pattern to unravel.' 7 Reputation, in turn,
will only work to make promissory commitments credible if other contracting parties can conveniently learn about the reasons why any particular transaction broke down. Consequently, a reputation for trustworthiness is difficult to establish, especially in heterogeneous economies where
most market participants are unfamiliar with any particular contracting
party.' Thus, it is generally assumed that many (if not most) contracts
fall outside the self-enforcing range.
15. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J.
1909, 1913 (1992).
16. There is an extensive literature on self-enforcing contracts. See, e.g., Benjamin
Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance,
89J. Pol. Econ. 615, 617 (1981); L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53J.
Bus. 27 (1980); Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 177, 201-02
(1985).
17. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra note 10, at 2033.
18. Reputations are most effective as a means of self-enforcement in small,
homogeneous communities, where contracting behavior soon becomes common
knowledge, and sanctions against untrustworthy parties can effectively be imposed. See
Avner Greif, Informal Contract Enforcement: Lessons from Medieval Trade, in 2 The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 287, 287-95 (Peter Newman ed., 1998)
[hereinafter New Palgrave Dictionary] (detailing effect of cultural and social factors on
self-enforcement); Landa, supra note 11, at 356 (explaining that members in kinship/
ethnic groups have strong incentive to remain loyal to each other). Sanctions for bad
behavior are also effective where industries establish trade associations that can both
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To qualify the earlier argument, therefore, legal rules matter where
reputation and repeat dealings do not or cannot restrain the incentive to
breach. In such an environment, legal enforcement is necessary to make
a promise to perform credible.' 9 The decision to enforce a contract
raises a set of subsidiary questions: What is the proper domain of freedom of contract? Within that domain, what is the proper role of the state
in interpreting the meaning of incomplete contracts? 211 Much recent
scholarship has focused on one or the other of these subsidiary questions,
but too little attention has been directed to the initial sorting question
and to understanding the line between informal, self-enforcing agreements and legally enforceable contracts. In this Article I begin the work
of developing a theory of contract enforcement by examining the domain
of self-enforcement and its relationship to legal enforcement.
A. Indefinite Agreements at Common Law
One of the core principles of the common law of contracts is that the
promises of parties to a legally enforceable contract must be certain and
definite such that their intention may be ascertained with a reasonable
degree of certainty. This principle was illustrated in the celebrated case
of Varney v. Ditmars, where the New York Court of Appeals declined to
enforce an agreement by an architect to give his draftsman "a fair share
of [the] profits" in exchange for a greater effort on some pressing
projects. 2 1 The court held that such an agreement was not only uncertain, but "is necessarily affected by so many other facts that are in themidentify bad behavior and impose appropriate sanctions, such as boycotts. The contracting
behavior of the members of the association thus becomes part of the group's collective
memory. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1771-77 (1996)
(explaining National Grain and Feed Association's procedures for facilitating trade
between members); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724,
1745-54 (2001) (detailing importance of reputation and nonlegal sanctions in cotton
industry).
19. There are at least two paradigmatic cases where legal enforcement of promises is
necessary in order to maximize social welfare: 1) in volatile markets where a party's failure
to perform could threaten its partner's survival; and 2) where the contractual surplus
would be maximized if one or both of the parties made relation-specific investments. In
either case, absent legal enforcement, promises to perform would not be credible and
parties would predictably decline to write the efficient contract. See Schwartz & Scott,
supra note 2.
20. The freedom of contract question focuses on the set of mandatory rules that limits
the enforcement of certain contracts on either substantive policy grounds or because of
defects in the bargaining process. Enforcement of contracts within that domain then
requires both a theory of interpretation that maps from the semantic content of the
parties' writing to the writing's legal implications as well as a set of efficient default rules
for those cases where contracting costs may have prevented the parties from solving their
contracting problems themselves. For discussion, see Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of
Article 2, 62 La. L. Rev. 1009, 1016-22 (2002).
21. 111 N.E. 822, 823 (N.Y. 1916).
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selves indefinite and uncertain that the intention of the parties is pure
conjecture .... Such an executory contract must rest for performance upon the
' 22
honor and good faith of the parties making it. "
An earlier New York case, Mackintosh v. Thompson, 23 further illustrates the kind of agreement that was found unenforceable under the
common law rule. In Mackintosh, the plaintiff sued to recover compensation in addition to a stated salary which had already been paid. He
claimed that while he was employed by the defendants, he informed
them that he intended to quit unless he was given an increase in salary.
In response, one of the defendants told him that they would make it
worth his while if he would stay on, promising to give him a share of the
profits on certain buildings that they were then constructing. When the
plaintiff asked what would be the amount of the bonus, he was told, "You
can rely on me. I will see that it is all right."2 4 The court held that the
arrangement was too indefinite to form the basis of any obligation on the
25
part of the defendant.
This common law rule not only applied to cases such as Varney and
Mackintosh where the contract terms themselves were vague, but also extended to agreements where essential terms were explicitly left to further
negotiation. For example, in Petze v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., a New
York appellate court held that an agreement providing that "the method
of accounting to determine the net distributable profits is to be agreed
upon later" was unenforceable under the indefiniteness rule. 26 Courts
thereafter consistently held that such "agreements to agree" were unen27
forceable so long as any essential term was open to negotiation.
Even at common law, however, the indefiniteness doctrine was subject to several qualifications. First, indefiniteness would not prevent a recovery in quantum meruit in the event one party to an informal agreement performed in reasonable reliance on its terms, even though they
were vague, indefinite, and uncertain.2X Second, the question of whether
the promise of a "fair" share of the profits or a "reasonable" compensation was too indefinite depended on the subject matter of the agreement.
In sales of goods, for example, common law courts held that the words
"fair and reasonable value" were a synonym for "market value" and thus a
definite promise to pay the fair market value of goods was inferred from
the express agreement of the parties.29 Indeed, the common law courts
22. Id. at 824 (emphasis added).
23. 68 N.Y.S. 492 (App. Div. 1901).
24. Id. at 494.
25. Id.
26. 109 N.Y.S. 328, 329 (App. Div. 1908).
27. See Robert E. Scott &Jody S. Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 34-44, 322-25 (3d
ed. 2002).
28. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Shapiro, 77 A.2d 598, 601 (Me. 1951) ("It is not necessary
that [plaintiff] lose the fair value of his services by reason of an illusory contract for a
bonus."); E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 3.30 (3d ed. 1999).
29. Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 824 (N.Y. 1916).
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went farther in the case of sales contracts, holding that even where a fixed
price or other consideration was not specified in the agreement, it was
presumed that a reasonable price was intended. Common law courts
showed no reluctance, therefore, in filling such gaps in sales contracts on
the view that "[s]uch contracts are common, and when there is nothing
so far as
therein to limit or prevent an implication as to the price they are,
'3
the terms of the contract are concerned, binding obligations. 30
The rationale of the common law indefiniteness doctrine, then, was
grounded in the presumed intentions of the parties. But where the parties did not make their intentions clear, the common law rule presumed
that the failure to reach agreement on material terms, where no terms
could be objectively supplied, implied an intention not to be legally
bound. Thus, under the common law rule the question of intent was
addressed indirectly, by looking at the extent to which material terms
were left unspecified by the parties. If the court found that the terms
were sufficiently complete and definite, it would infer from that fact the
intent to contract; if not, the court would infer that the parties did not
intend to be bound.
B. The Modem View on Indefiniteness and Open Terms
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code followed the line of
cases holding that price terms in sales contracts could be supplied from
evidence of market prices. Thus, U.C.C. § 2-305 provides that parties can
conclude a sales contract even though the price is not specified or they
agree to agree on a price and are subsequently unable to agree."' But the
Code goes beyond the common law in explicitly authorizing an expansive
role for courts in filling open terms in otherwise incomplete agreements. 321 As I noted above, the justification for the common law rule was
that it honored the intent of the parties. That is also the justification for
U.C.C. § 2-204: It honors the parties' intent to be bound. The difference, then, is not the purpose of the rule but the presumption that follows from agreements with open or indefinite terms. The U.C.C. shifts
from the bright-line rule of the common law to a broad standard. Under
30. Id.
31. U.C.C. § 2-305 (2002) states:
The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the
price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price . . . if (a)
nothing is said as to price; or (b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and
they fail to agree....
32. U.C.C. § 2-204 provides that "[e]ven though one or more terms are left open a
contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." The
Official Comment to this provision provides that "the fact that one or more terms are left
to be agreed upon [is not] enough of itself to defeat an otherwise adequate agreement.
Rather commercial standards .. .are intended to be applied, this Act making provision
elsewhere for missing terms needed for performance, open price, remedies and the like."
§ 2-204 cmt.

1650

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:1641

the U.C.C. standard, a court is asked to focus on the underlying question
of intent directly, and is encouraged to infer that intent despite the existence of open or indefinite terms. That, of course, is just what many
courts have done.""
The standard-based approach of the U.C.C., now followed as well by
the Restatement,3 4 is justified primarily by the defects of the common law
bright-line rule. In many contracting contexts a rule that determines intent by focusing on missing terms is seriously overinclusive. All contracts
are incomplete; therefore, the fact of incompleteness does not by itself
imply an intention to avoid legal enforcement. Incompleteness may be
caused by many factors, including the desire for flexibility and the unwillingness of parties to condition future performance on nonobservable or
nonverifiable measures of performance. Thus, an intention to be bound
to terms reasonably supplied by courts may often be the best inference to
be drawn from relational contracts that are incomplete owing to such
exogenous factors.But, at least implicitly, the modern approach goes even farther, shifting the presumption toward enforcement whenever terms are left open
or are indefinite. Professor Corbin perhaps best expressed this view:
In considering expressions of agreement, the court must
not hold the parties to some impossible, or ideal, or unusual
standard. It must take language as it is and people as they are.
All agreements have some degree of indefiniteness and some
degree of uncertainty.
If the parties have concluded a transaction in which it appears that they intend to make a contract, the court should not
frustrate their intention if it is possible to reach a fair and just
result, even though this requires a choice among conflicting
meanings and the filling of some gaps that the parties have left.
The fact that the parties have left some matters to be determined in the future should not prevent enforcement, if some
method of determination independent of a party's mere "wish,
will, and desire" exists, either by virtue of the agreement itself or
36
by commercial practice or other usage or custom.
33. See Scott & Kraus, supra note 27, at 315-22.
34. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra note 5, § 33.
35. See supra note 3. To be sure, an intention to be legally bound is not the only
inference to be drawn friom exogenous incompleteness. Another possibility is that the
parties intend to renegotiate ex post once the uncertainty is removed.
36. 1 Corbin, supra note 8, § 95, at 396, 400-01; see also Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, supra note 5, § 33 cmt. a ("[T]he actions of the parties may show conclusively
that they have intended to conclude a binding agreement, even though one or more terms
are missing or are left to be agreed upon. In such cases courts endeavor, if possible, to
attach a sufficiently definite meaning to the bargain."). Justice Cardozo put the
contemporary presumption in favor of enforcement this way: "Indefiniteness must reach
the point where construction becomes futile." Heyman Cohen & Sons v. M. Lurie Woolen
Co., 133 N.E. 370, 371 (N.Y. 1921); see also Denver D. Darling, Inc. v. Controlled Env'ts
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The contemporary presumption toward filling gaps in incomplete
contracts has led commentators to assume that the common law indefiniteness doctrine is no longer a serious impediment to legal enforcement.3 7 But, surprisingly, the nearly universal acceptance of the judicial
practice of supplying open terms for relational contracts has not slowed
the pace of litigation over indefinite agreements. Moreover, even when
these agreements are assessed under the contemporary standard, many
fail to pass muster. In recent years, courts have invoked the indefiniteness doctrine to refuse enforcement of promises to pay "costs and expenses for sumptuous living and maintenance,"3' 8 to forgo collection "as
long as [debtor] make[s] progress toward profitability, '3 9 to "provide future financing,"'4 to send a seller "some work," 4' and to provide "loan
supervision information.

' 42

In sum, the law of indefiniteness is not a story of a traditional common law rule for limiting legal liability being inexorably overturned by a

contemporary preference for filling gaps with broad standards of good
faith, reasonableness, and the like. Evidence that courts continue to sort
agreements that lack material terms on the basis of the indefiniteness
doctrine may reflect a further example of the tension between common
law formalism and Code contextualism, a tension that is clearly evident,
43
for example, in widely disparate theories of contractual interpretation.
But if the disparate results in indefiniteness cases reflect more than simply this tension, it is important to identify the factors that determine
Constr., Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 223-24 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Corbin); Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 468 A.2d 748, 766-67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (describing
intent of U.C.C. to preserve contracts and fill in gaps), aff'd, 488 A.2d 581 (Pa. 1985);
Novelly Oil Co. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 433 N.W.2d 628, 629 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (describing
"liberality" of indefiniteness principle).
37. For example, John Calamari and Joseph Perillo have described contemporary
judicial practice as follows:
[U]nder the traditional rule where the parties have purported to agree on a
material term and left it indefinite, the agreement is too vague and indefinite. If,
however, the parties are merely silent as to material term [sic] or discuss the term
but do not purport to agree on it and do not condition their agreement on an
agreement as to this term, there is a strong possibility that a term may be implied
from surrounding circumstances or supplied by a court using a gap-filler.
John D. Calamari &Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 51-55 (4th ed. 1998); see also
Cergen, supra note 3, at 1062 (providing arguments against "the now (happily) discredited
doctrine that courts ought not enforce indefinite contracts").
38. Trimmer v. Van Bomel, 434 N.Y.S.2d 82, 86 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
39. Champaign Nat'l Bank v. Landers Seed Co., 519 N.E.2d 957, 960 (IIl. App. Ct.
1988).
40. Union State Bank v. Woell, 434 N.W.2d 712, 717 (N.D. 1989).
41. Roy v. Danis, 553 A.2d 663, 664 (Me. 1989).
42. Univ. Nat'l Bank v. Ernst & WAhinney, 773 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Tex. App. 1989).
43. See, for example, the current split between courts that apply a "hard" parol
evidence rule and a strong plain meaning rule and courts following the "soft" parol
evidence and contextual meaning rules of the U.C.C. Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence
Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 533, 534 (1998).
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when a contract is likely to be held unenforceable owing to indefiniteness, and how these agreements differ from those where courts routinely
fill gaps with open terms. These questions cannot be answered so long as
the patterns of contemporary indefiniteness litigation are examined casually and unsystematically. In the following discussion, therefore, I report
the results of a systematic examination of the indefiniteness case law and
undertake a functional analysis of how courts do, in fact, sort between
enforceable and unenforceable agreements.
C. What Do Courts Actually Do?
In order to create a database for evaluating the enforcement decisions of contemporary American courts, I began with a sample of all litigated cases between 1998 and 2002. A search for contracts cases of the
past five years that invoke certainty as to subject matter returned 238 decisions. 4 4 A detailed examination of 137 cases randomly selected from the
base pool revealed forty-eight cases where the issue of indefiniteness was
only peripherally relevant to the outcome. 45 In many of these cases, the
issue was raised in the context of preliminary negotiations where the defendant claimed that the representation relied on by the plaintiff was insufficiently definite to be characterized as an offer or an acceptance. In
these instances, therefore, the underlying question was whether the parties had reached an agreement at all, rather than the further question:
Assuming the parties have concluded an agreement, is that agreement
4
legally enforceable as a contract? "
The remaining eighty-nine cases directly raise the issue of enforcement.4 7 In thirty-four cases the court enforced the contract despite the
defendant's claim that the agreement was indefinite. In the remaining
44. 1 searched Westlaw's 95k9(1) database-Contracts: Requisites and Validity:
Nature and Essentials in General: Certainty as to Subject-Matter: In General-restricting
it to all state and federal cases in the last five years. I conducted the search in January
2003.
45. The random selection process proceeded in two stages. I first selected one of
every four cases in the base pool for a sample of sixty cases. Subsequently, I expanded the
sample by selecting every other case from the remaining 178 cases, yielding a total sample
of 149 cases. I then discarded twelve cases where indefiniteness or certainty was not
discussed in the body of the opinion, leaving a sample of 137 cases.
46. The issue of precontractual liability raises interesting but quite different questions
from those discussed in this paper. For this reason, I leave aside the issues of
precontractual reliance and the related question of when, if ever, liability should attach
prior to the conclusion of an agreement (albeit an indefinite one). For the best doctrinal
analysis of this question, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 217 (1987). For
recent law and economic analyses, see Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient
Reliance, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 481 (1996); Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and
Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 385
(1999); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel
in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 Yale LJ. 1249 (1996).
47. The cases are coded and tabulated infra tables I & 2.
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fifty-five cases the court denied enforcement, despite finding that the parties had concluded an agreement, on the grounds that the agreement was
too indefinite and uncertain and thus was legally unenforceable as a contract. 48 One hypothesis that might explain the different results is that
those courts enforcing allegedly indefinite agreements are following the
trend of the U.C.C. and the Second Restatement, while the larger number of
courts that deny enforcement are adhering to the traditional common
law view. 49 This hypothesis implies 1) that the cases granting enforcement would include a larger number of Code cases, and 2) that nonCode cases would divide between states following the traditional view and
those adopting the modern approach to open terms.
Neither of these empirical conditions is confirmed by the data. First,
only one of the cases granting enforcement involved the sale of goods
under the U.CC. 5°1 Indeed, in only three instances did a court cite with

48. It is equally noteworthy that, of the fifty-five cases denying enforcement on the
grounds of uncertainty, only two authorized restitutionary relief for the plaintiff. See
Bergman v. Delulio, 826 So. 2d 500, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that plaintiff
had viable quantum meruit claim against defendant but could not recover damages on his
claim); Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Uneco Realty Co., 765 N.E.2d 420, 425-26
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (holding that plaintiff had viable quantum meruit claim). The
conventional view is that a promisee can recover in restitution for partial performance of
an indefinite agreement. Thus, for example, courts have permitted an employee to
recover in quantum meruit for the value of extra efforts induced by his employer's promise
to share the resulting profits. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Shapiro, 77 A.2d 598, 602 (Me. 1951);
Farnsworth, supra note 28, § 3.30 ("[I]f an employer's promise to pay an employee a share
of the profits in addition to a wage is unenforceable for indefiniteness, the employee may
have restitution of the reasonable value of any services performed in excess of the wages
paid."). But where both the promise to perform additional work as well as the promise to
provide a "bonus" are indefinite, the cases from the sample deny relief altogether. See,
e.g., Chirichillo v. Prasser, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1140 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (holding there was
no evidence parties even struck a bargain as plaintiff "asked for nothing" and defendant
"offered nothing in return"); Burns v. Dees, 557 S.E.2d 32, 38 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)
(concluding that agreement is invalid because defendant did not promise to provide
plaintiff with definite share of profits in return for plaintiff providing certain services);
Mooney v. Mooney, 538 S.E.2d 864, 867 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding contract
unenforceable because parties never discussed particulars of defendant's promise to help
care for grandchild); Smith v. Hammons, 63 S.W.3d 320, 325-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)
(sustaining summary judgment in favor of defendant where parties did not agree on
essential terms of contract, such as plaintiff's share of profits, and plaintiff's promise to
perform additional work was absent altogether); Cheloha v. Cheloha, 582 N.W.2d 291,
297-98 (Neb. 1998) (holding purported contract unenforceable because indefinite as to
material terms); see also cases cited infra table 2.
49. See Nellie Eunsoo Choi, Note, Contracts with Open or Missing Terms Under the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Common Law: A Proposal for Unification, 103
Coltim. L. Rev. 50, 52-53 (2003) (framing divergent results in cases as jurisdictional divide
in which "[s] ome jurisdictions apply the traditional common-law doctrine and hold service
contracts with open or missing terms invalid for indefiniteness, while others apply the
modern U.C.C. approach to hold the contracts valid" (footnote omitted)).
50. See Am. Laminates, Inc. v.J.S. Latta Co., 980 S.W.2d 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
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approval the Code approach to open terms, 5 1 and the Second Restatement
view was the basis for decision in just four others.5 2 Moreover, the division between enforcement and nonenforcement is not correlated with
whether or not the state has a traditional or modern approach to contractual liability. In two states, California and Pennsylvania, the courts acknowledged a presumption favoring enforcement and filling gaps whenever possible. 5 "1 But notwithstanding the presumption, courts in those
states divided on the question of whether the agreement at issue was enforceable. 5 4 In the remaining thirty-one jurisdictions, the courts at least
formally applied the traditional indefiniteness doctrine, yet the cases divided roughly two to one between nonenforcement and enforcement. In
eight states-Connecticut, Maryland, New York, Illinois, Ohio, Georgia,
Tennessee, and Texas-appellate courts reached different enforcement
decisions on different facts. 5 5 Taken as a whole, therefore, the data tend
to refute the conventional academic wisdom that the legal standard by
5,
itself influences the enforcement choice.
Rather, the cases drawn from the sample show that courts generally
focus on whether the parties have fully exploited verifiable information in
concluding their agreements. 57 Where the contract is incomplete owing
51. See ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Communications, Inc., 155 F.3d 659, 666-67 (3d
Cir. 1998) (citing U.C.C. § 2-311 (1) (2002)); Willow Funding Co. v. Grencom Assocs., 779
A.2d 174, 182 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (citing Connecticut codification of U.C.C. § 2-204);
Am. Laminates, Inc., 980 S.W.2d at 22-23 (citing Missouri codification of U.C.C. § 2204(3)). One possible explanation for the absence of Code cases in the sample is that the
Code rule on open terms, especially price terms, is sufficiently clear and well established
that parties decline to litigate "settled" law.
52. See Gonzalez v. Don King Prods., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 313, 315 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra note 5, § 204); Gallagher, Langlas &
Gallagher v. Burco, 587 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, supra note 5, § 33); Kostelnik v. Helper, 770 N.E.2d 58, 63 (Ohio
2002) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra note 5, § 34(2)); Davidson v.
Holtzman, 47 S.W.3d 445, 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, supra note 5, § 33).
53. ATACS Corp., 155 F.3d at 666-67; Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., 107 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 209, 217-18 (Ct. App. 2001).
54. Compare ATACS Corp., 155 F.3d at 668, and Denver D. Darling, Inc. v. Controlled
Env'ts Constr., Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 224 (Ct. App. 2001), with Aircraft Guar. Corp. v.
Strato-Lift, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 830, 836-37 (E.D. Pa. 2000), and Halvorsen v. Aramark
Unif. Servs., Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383, 386 (Ct. App. 1998).
55. New York is perhaps the most influential state in the sample. Thirteen
indefiniteness cases came out of New York courts. Enforcement was denied in ten
instances and granted in three.
56. Cf. Choi, supra note 49, at 52-53.
57. In coding the nature of the information available to the parties to these
agreements, I use a richer conception of verifiability than is common to formal contract
theory. I define a measure of performance as verifiable if competent legal counsel is
prepared to opine, ex ante, that the failure of the other party to perform can be
demonstrated to a court with a substantial probability of success. Relevant to this
prediction is not only the cost of producing evidence but also the relationship between the
legal standard of proof and the management of evidence, and the relative complexity and
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to uncertain future states that are not observable or not verifiable, the
courts will typically enforce the contract by filling the resulting gaps. In
that sense, the disputed performance cannot be contracted for and the
incompleteness is thus exogenous to the contract. But if the parties appear to have discarded verifiable information that they might have used
at relatively low cost to condition performance, the courts decline to enforce the agreement. Here the failure to use available measures of performance suggests either that the parties' action was the result of inadvertence or that the agreement was deliberately indefinite.
1. Legally Enforceable Incompleteness. - In thirty-four of the sample
cases, the courts enforced contracts notwithstanding the claim of indefiniteness. 58 The enforceable agreements ranged across a variety of contexts from business development and marketing5 9 to investment contracts, 6°) and from distributorship agreements 6 1 to joint ventures. 62 In
each of these contexts, the parties faced the canonical "contracting problem" of ensuring both efficient ex ante investment and efficient ex post
trade in the subject matter of the contract. 63 In each case, however, the
parties negotiated over complex transactions and were forced to cope
with problems of hidden action and hidden information. Thus, high
transaction costs as well as problems of asymmetric information 64 would
interdependence of the measures of performance in the contract. This definition of
verifiability raises a further complication that I sidestep in this paper. This paper, and most
economic theory, treat verifiability as an exogenous variable. But, in fact, whether a
measure of performance is verifiable or not is subject to some party control. Thus, the
motivation for a particular contract term may be the ability of the moving party to
manipulate the proof necessary to establish the fact in question. See, e.g., Franklin Allen &
Douglas Gale, Measurement Distortion and Missing Contingencies in Optimal Contracts, 2
Econ. Theory 1, 5 (1992) (discussing assumed ability of supplier to distort contingent
measurement system, while pointing out potential costs to that supplier of doing so). For a
discussion of the relationship between optimal contract design and the strategic
management of evidence, see Chris Sanchirico & George Triantis, Evidence Arbitrage:
The Fabrication of Evidence and the Verifiability of Contract Performance (Univ. of Va.
Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 02-17, Dec. 2002), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf? abstractid=353243 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
58. See infra table 1.
59. Quadron Software Int'l Corp. v. Plotseneder, 568 S.E.2d 178, 180-81 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2002).
60. Giannaris v. Cheng, 219 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690-91 (D. Md. 2002).
61. Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209, 218 (Ct. App. 2001).
62. DeBoer Structures (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Shaffer Tent & Awning Co., 233 F. Supp. 2d
934, 949 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
63. Contracting parties invest efficiently when they take actions that maximize the
expected surplus from their contract. Contractors trade efficiently when, and only when,
the value of the exchanged performance to the buyer is greater than the cost of
performance to the seller. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2.
64. Asymmetric information results from private facts that either cannot be observed
by the other party or cannot be verified to a third party. See Alan Schwartz, Incomplete
Contracts, in 2 New Palgrave Dictionary, supra note 18, at 277, 280-82 (1998) (describing
problems of contracting under conditions of asymmetric information); see also Ian Ayres
& Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal
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likely have prevented the parties to these contracts from writing complete, first-best efficient contracts. When these conditions prevent parties
from creating a term, the resulting contract is incomplete but may nevertheless be second-best efficient.
To understand the reasoning that underlies this conclusion, consider a salient example, Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C.6 In Krantz,
plaintiff and defendant were in the business of marketing telecommunications systems. Plaintiff alleged the following facts: He and defendant
entered into a "reseller agreement" by which defendant appointed plaintiff its distributor for San Francisco and Main County with the right to
sell its video conferencing equipment and other products. Thereafter,
plaintiff and defendant signed a "teaming agreement" in which they
agreed to submit a joint bid for Kaiser Permanente's video conferencing
business both within and outside the Bay Area. To enhance the chances
of getting the contract with Kaiser, plaintiff agreed to reduce his commission on the sale of defendant's products."" In exchange, the parties
agreed that, if their joint bid was successful, plaintiff would receive an
increased profit margin on future business from Kaiser and the parties
would share jointly in all subsequent business with Kaiser."7 Defendant
ignored the teaming agreement and submitted its bid to Kaiser independently. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract and sought an accounting
and recovery of lost profits. The trial court granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment on the grounds of indefiniteness. The California
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, while one "might agree the unstated future margins and price terms are indefinite, they were necessarily so:
it remained to be seen whether the joint proposal would be accepted.""8
The court in Krantz identified the key variable that triggers ajudicial
decision to enforce: The parties wrote as complete an agreement as they
could under the circumstances.! ' The information that they discarded
involved the relationship between the plaintiffs efforts in servicing Kaiser
under the contract and the defendant's investment in customized components suitable for Kaiser. The interaction between these inputs was complex. Both of these interactive inputs were essential ingredients to the
Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729 (1992) (same). For formal analyses of the effects of asymmetric
information on incomplete contracting, see B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston,
Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity, 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 902 (1998); Benjamin E.
Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, Judicial Modification of Contracts Between Sophisticated
Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach, 9J.L. Econ. &
Org. 230, 245-48 (1993); Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall, Income Fluctuation and
Asymmetric Information: An Example of a Repeated Principal-Agent Problem, 51.J. Econ.
Theory 367, 367-70 (1990).
65. 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 209.
66. Id. at 211-13.
67. Specifically, the parties agreed to negotiate precise profit margins and product
pricing once the bid was accepted. Id. at 218.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id.
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price of the product to Kaiser and to the resulting profits available for
division. Thus, the complexity of the relationship would have increased
the transaction costs of specifying profit margins more concretely. Moreover, neither the plaintiff's marketing efforts nor the quality of the defendant's specialized investment could be verified to a court. Selecting a
contract term that conditions performance on unverifiable information
would have been a poor choice because it would have created moral hazard. When a party cannot observe or verify the value of a relevant economic parameter, such as effort or quality, that party will reject a contract
that conditions on that parameter because of the risk that the other party
will behave strategically.7 11Where the incompleteness is predominantly a
function of environmental complexity or of informational asymmetries,
the data show that courts regard the resulting contract as "obligationally
71
complete" and thus legally enforceable.
2. Unenforceable Indefinite Agreements. - By contrast with Krantz, in
fifty-five of the sample cases appellate courts refused to enforce the parties' agreement on the grounds of indefiniteness. 72 In a handful of cases,
the indefiniteness seemed clearly to be the product of inadvertence or
carelessness on the part of the parties (or their lawyers) in writing the
contract. 73 But the bulk of the cases where courts denied enforcement to
indefinite agreements cannot be understood in terms of careless omissions or an inadvertent failure to negotiate over conditions of performance that were otherwise verifiable. Rather, the facts support the hypothesis that the parties intentionally and deliberately concluded agreements
that were indefinite as to key terms and that later resulted in litigation.
Moreover, unlike the cases of exogenous incompleteness, in these instances the parties failed to incorporate in their agreements readily available, verifiable measures of performance. In sum, the parties to these
agreements appear to have preferred the indefinite agreement they concluded to the more explicit and verifiable alternative that they ignored.

70. Parties will write a more complete contract covering a specialized investment
(such as the efforts of the plaintiff or the output of the defendant) when (i) they can
specify clearly what standards the investment is to meet; (ii) the investment will meet those
standards if undertaken correctly; and (iii) a party can prove to a court that the product of
the investment did or did not satisfy the contractual standards. Schwartz & Scott, supra
note 2. Krantz shows that these conditions are sometimes hard to meet. Contracts that
compensate a seller on the basis of the quality of the end-product or an agent on the basis
of the value of her efforts can create efficient incentives only when quality or effort is
verifiable. Id.
71. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 64, at 731.
72. See infra table 2.
73. See Don Webster Co. v. Indian W. Express, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 959 (S.D. Ind.
2001); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Car & Truck Leasing Sys., Inc., 574 S.E.2d 914 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2002); Bulloch S., Inc. v. Gosai, 550 S.E.2d 750 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Strauss Paper Co.
v. RSA Executive Search, Inc., 688 N.Y.S.2d 641 (App. Div. 1999); Kostelnik v. Helper, 770
N.E.2d 58 (Ohio 2002).
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Although there are some variations in the cases, two common factual
patterns predominate. The first, illustrated by Smith v. Hammons,7 4 is the
"indefinite bonus contract.117 5 Smith entered into an agreement with
Hammons Entertainment to produce and perform in a magic show. The
parties agreed that Smith would be paid a stipulated yearly salary of
$150,000 in return for using his creative efforts to "[d] esign, stage, direct,
perform and star in [a] magic and music show. '7 6 In addition, the agreement specified that if Smith faithfully performed his obligations, Hammons would subsequently pay Smith a signing bonus as well as a share of
the profits from the show. Subsequently, Hammons became disappointed with Smith's efforts and fired him. Smith sued for his share of
the bonus and lost profits. The court affirmed a summary judgment for
Hammons, holding the bonus agreement too indefinite and thus
77
unenforceable.
The second archetype is a variation on the same theme. Here, the
parties enter into what is traditionally designated an "agreement to
agree" and what we might term a "comfort agreement. 7 8 As an example,
in Hunt v. Coker the parties entered into a written agreement expressing
their joint desire for Coker to sell, and Hunt to buy, Coker's insurance
agency.79 The document provided for a purchase date and set out several
options for the purchase price, including 45% of the commissions that
renew over five years, or 40% of the commissions that renew over six
years, or 35% that renew over seven years. 80 The agreement provided
that Hunt would consolidate his location with Coker as soon as possible,
with each party paying his own expenses until the sale date. Subsequently, Coker became unhappy with Hunt's work and informed him
that the offer of sale would not be honored. Hunt sued for breach.,,
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court dismissing the
74. 63 S.W.3d 320 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
75. Eighteen cases in the sample are coded as "indefinite bonus contracts." See infra
table 2.
76. Hammons, 63 S.W.3d at 322.
77. Id. at 326.
78. The informal agreements to agree that I have designated "comfort agreements"
are a subset of the larger category of agreements to agree that include, among others,
formal letters of intent. The analogy is to "comfort letters" that are typically issued by a
parent company to a lending institution and are aimed at encouraging the lender to issue
credit to a subsidiary. The letter seeks to assure the lender without the parent committing
itself as a surety or a guarantor. For further discussion, see Larry A. DiMatteo & Ren6
Sacasas, Credit and Value Comfort Instruments: Crossing the Line from Assurance to
Legally Significant Reliance and Toward a Theory of Enforceability, 47 Baylor L. Rev. 357
(1995); Rend Sacasas & Don Wiesner, Comfort Letters: The Legal and Business
Implications, 104 Banking L.J. 313 (1987). Eleven of the sample cases are coded as
"comfort agreements," while four others involved more formal letters of intent. See infra
table 2.
79. 741 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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suit on the grounds of indefiniteness. The purchase "options" were not
true options, the court held, since the parties never agreed that Hunt
should have the right to choose among the designated alternatives and
thus the parties never agreed on a stipulated price. Rather, the court
found the agreement akin to an agreement to agree and thus
8 2
unenforceable.
In the cases falling within each of these prototypes, the courts appear
most influenced by the failure of the parties to agree on readily available,
verifiable terms. A stipulated bonus for achieving specific performance
standards could easily have been negotiated in Hammons.8 3 For example,
the parties could have conditioned a fixed bonus on predetermined "deliverables" (or benchmarks) that are themselves verifiable and serve as
proxies for the level of efforts requested by the promisor.8 4 Alternatively,
the parties could have specified an advance against a percentage of the
profits from the magic show as is common in many franchising and licensing contexts. s 5 Similarly, in Hunt the parties could have chosen a
single method of determining the purchase price of the agency, or they
could have granted to one of the parties a real option to select among the
alternative pricing formulae. In both cases, therefore, the parties' failure
to make the agreement sufficiently definite, and thus legally binding,
seems to have been intentional and deliberate. In other words, the indefiniteness was endogenous to the contract, and the courts appear to infer
from that fact that the parties either do not intend or do not deserve legal
enforcement.
82. Id. at 1015.
83. In addition, see Larson v.Johnson, 184 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29-38 (D. Me. 2002): In
1995, Johnson asked Larson to supervise a construction project on his property in Maine.
Larson was paid a monthly rate of $6,700 based on the total estimated cost of the project,
plus lodging, divided into monthly payments. After completing the project, Johnson was
so pleased with the quality of the work and Larson's effort that he gave Larson a $175,000
bonus for doing the job. Thereafter, Johnson permitted Larson to live on his property
rent free in exchange for basic caretaking duties. Subsequently, in 1999, Johnson asked
Larson to supervise a further project to construct a workshop on the property. Larson
asked for the same rate ($6,700 per month) as per the prior job. Johnson responded that
he would "take care" of Larson if he would do the project and told him to "trust the Great
Oracle" (meaning Johnson). Larson worked on the shop project in addition to his other
duties for over nine months, but when he asked repeatedly to be paid at the same rate as
the earlier job, Johnson fired him. The court held that the claim to a "bonus" was too
indefinite but that Larson's claim for wages at his earlier rate presented a jury question.
In Larson,just as in Hammons, the parties failed to exploit any number of commonly
used terms to create an enforceable incentive contract. For example, a specific bonus
could have been pegged to desirable effects of Larson's efforts-e.g., finishing the job on
time or bringing the project in under budget. Or, the parties could have used a third
party, such as an architect, as the arbiter of quality.
84. The stipulation for prescribed "deliverables" is common in many transactional
settings, such as contracts between architects and their clients.
85. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, The Net Profits Puzzle, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 524, 525
(1997) (describing ubiquitous use of royalty offsets against fixed advances in
entertainment industry).
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These cases of deliberately incomplete agreements present a genuine puzzle. The sample data show that courts are uniform in declining to
enforce these agreements. And yet relatively sophisticated parties in business transactions continue to negotiate such agreements in the shadow of
judicial nonenforcement. This behavior appears directly inconsistent
with the assumptions of contract theory that parties will not contract over
nonverifiable terms but will contract over verifiable terms that can be
specified at low cost.
How can we understand these cases? Let us begin by noting some
common features: The agreements are simple rather than complex, and
the commitments made by each promisor are clear. Thus, the interaction is relatively free from the moral ambiguity that attends complex interactions. 86 In this respect, these cases are quite unlike those described
above where the courts enforce the incomplete contract. A plausible hypothesis, therefore, is that these contracts are self-enforcing; either the
parties are relying on reputational sanctions or on the overhang of repeated interactions to make their promises credible. Indeed, the similar
practice of firms issuing legally unenforceable "comfort letters" to prospective lenders has been explained as a reputational signal that makes
7
the agreements self-enforcing.
But the cases in the sample do not square easily with the common
understanding of the domain of self-enforcing agreements. The transactions represented by the cases are, for the most part, isolated, one-shot
interactions between relative strangers in heterogeneous markets where
reputational constraints are thought to be quite weak. 8 In such an environment, reputation alone is an inadequate means of credibly enforcing
promises. Even if others can observe the interaction, they are unlikely to
learn about the true reasons why the particular transaction broke down.
Without moral clarity, the mere fact of breakdown is not sufficient to impose a reputational cost on either party. If self-enforcement is to be a
satisfactory explanation for this puzzle, therefore, its domain must be sig86. The respective undertakings of each party and the failure to perform one or more
of them are relatively obvious in simple, clear transactions. In that sense, the transaction
has a moral clarity. By contrast, in complex transactions where the parties' performances
are iterated, it is often difficult to determine which party has first failed to perform as
promised. Given the highly interactive nature of the parties' responses to each other, it is
difficult to know whether one party's failure to perform a particular task represents a
breach of promise or is a measured, retaliatory response to an earlier failure of
performance by the other. For discussion, see Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra note
10, at 2051-53.
87. See Sacasas & Wiesner, supra note 78, at 329 ("Legally vague promises and
inferences from cautious language are not always valueless in business.... Custom shows
that memorializing even a weak legal commitment carries some moral and business weight.
The letter can be shown to others, and reputations can be injured by the writer's breach of
faith.").
88. In 67% (thirty-seven of fifty-five) of the cases where the courts declined
enforcement, the transactions were essentially discrete, one-shot interactions between
relative strangers. See infra table 2.
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nificantly larger than is conventionally assumed. In the discussion that
follows in Part II, I evaluate emerging economic theories of reciprocal
fairness that purport to broaden the domain of self-enforcement to include the transactions evidenced in the data.
II.

RECIPROCAL FAIRNESS AS A MEANS OF SELF-ENFORCEMENT

Ideas about fairness are entrenched in legal doctrine, including contract doctrine. Equitable estoppel, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment,
the doctrine of avoidable consequences, unconscionability, good faith,
reasonableness, and reformation are just a few of the contract doctrines
that might be understood in fairness terms. Moreover, many people hold
strong notions of fairness that reflect an apparent predisposition toward
reciprocity and equality of treatment. But law and economics scholars
have largely ignored the fairness debate. One reason is that the claims of
law and economics rest on the predictive power of rational choice theory,
a theory that assumes individuals choose between competing alternatives
based on rational self-interest.
In recent years, two sustained lines of attack have been mounted
against rational choice theory. The first-behavioral decision theorychallenges the rationality assumption and has gained much attention
among legal scholars."9 There is now substantial evidence that individuals make systematic cognitive mistakes in laboratory experiments when
asked to solve specified individual decision problems. 9 But these experiments do not test a general theory of how people make decisions. Thus,
they raise the question of external validity: Will parties in the real world
behave as the experimental subjects did?91 Because the answer to this
question is unclear, the legal implications of behavioral decision theory
92
remain open to debate.
89. There is an extensive literature traveling under the label of "behavioral law and
economics" that builds on research in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics.
See, e.g., ChristineJolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998). For a survey of the literature, see Daniel C.
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories ofJudgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship:
A Literature Review, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1499 (1998).
90. The early seminal work in this field includes Richard H. Thaler, Quasi Rational
Economics (1991); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979); Richard Thaler, Some Empirical
Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 Econ. Letters 201 (1981); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman,Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124 (1974).
91. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2; see Jessica L. Cohen & William T. Dickens, A
Foundation for Behavioral Economics, Am. Econ. Rev.: AEA Papers and Proceedings,
Special Edition May 2002, at 335, 335 (noting that "lack of theoretical foundations [means
that] the policy influence of [behavioral economics] is limited by its inability to predict
circumstances in which anomalous behavior will arise (other than in those sorts of
circumstances in which it has been observed before) or how it will respond to policy
changes").
92. For a comprehensive analysis of the psychological literature that questions the
normative relevance of behavioral decision theory for legal policy, see Gregory Mitchell,
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The second critique, which has received much less attention, accepts
rationality as a first-order approximation of individual choice, but challenges the claim that all individuals are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. Recent work in experimental economics has provided
robust evidence that many experimental subjects have strong preferences
for fairness and reciprocity."", This evidence implies that a substantial
fraction of people are motivated by fairness concerns as well as by selfinterest.9- 4 If people differ in regard to how selfishly or fairmindedly they
behave, this difference has important economic and legal consequences.
In particular, the social preferences for reciprocity and equality of treatment are the strongest candidates for developing a theory that expands
the range of self-enforcing contracts to include isolated interactions between relative strangers.
This Part describes the results of recent investigations showing that a
significant fraction of experimental subjects behave as if fairness were an
important motivation (even in isolated interactions) while the other fraction react as if motivated entirely by self-interest. The evidence that in
any population roughly half are fair and half are self-interested provides
Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 43 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1907 (2002); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and
Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics'
Equal Incompetence, 91 Geo. L.J. 67 (2002).
93. See generally Martin Dufwenberg & Georg Kirchsteiger, A Theory of Sequential
Reciprocity, Games & Econ. Behav. (forthcoming 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental
Evidence, 65 Econometrica 833 (1997); Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of
Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, 114 Q.J. Econ. 817 (1999) [hereinafter Fehr &
Schmidt, Fairness, Competition and Cooperation]; David K. Levine, Modeling Altruism
and Spitefulness in Experiments, 1 Rev. Econ. Dynamics 593 (1998); Matthew Rabin,
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 Al. Econ. Rev. 1281 (1993);
Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, A Theory of Reciprocity (Inst. for Empirical Research in
Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 6, July 2000), available at http://
www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwpOO6.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For a review
of the literature, see Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46
Eur. Econ. Rev. 687 (2002) [hereinafter Fehr & Falk, Psychological Foundations]. Despite
the experimental results, rational choice theorists are reluctant to abandon the self-interest
assumption. One reason is that this assumption has been quite successful in providing
accurate predictions in some economic domains. For example, models based on selfinterest make very good predictions about the behavior of parties in competitive markets.
There is a further, methodological reason. Changing assumptions about preferences
makes it much more difficult to generate testable hypotheses because phenomena can
then be explained by assuming the "right" preferences. The experimental evidence
suggests, however, that this convention may no longer make much sense. Ernst Fehr &
Klaus Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity-Evidence and Economic
Applications 2 (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No.
75, 2001), available at http://www.iew.Lnizh.ch/wp/iewwpO75.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity].
94. Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra note 93, at 2. The experimental
findings are robust as to the experimental subjects, but the relevance of this data for the
general population raises the separate question of external validity. See discussion infi-a
Part lID.
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the foundation for two complementary theories of fairness that are
grounded in the human motivation to reciprocate. In addition, I analyze
the results of recent experiments testing these theories in the context of
one-shot contractual interactions between perfect strangers. This experimental evidence suggests that incompletely specified contracts that leave
space for reciprocation can achieve higher levels of efficiency than more
explicit, legally enforceable contracts. These fairness values appear to interact with and complement the self-interest motivation of economic
actors.
A. The Empirical Evidence: The Heterogeneity of Fairness and Self-Interest
The empirical challenge to the self-interest hypothesis began in the
1980s when experimental economists started to study bilateral bargaining
games in controlled laboratory settings. One of the games that produced
the most dramatic evidence of social preferences other than self-interest
was the Ultimatum Game. 9 5 In the Ultimatum Game, a pair of subjects,
separated from each other, must anonymously agree on the division of a
fixed sum of money (say $100). Party A (the proposer) makes a single
proposal of how to divide the amount. Party B (the responder) can either accept or reject the proposal. If B accepts, then each takes away her
respective sum. If B rejects, then both get nothing. Under the standard
assumptions of rational choice theory, there is a Nash equilibrium in
which A proposes the smallest money unit available (say $1) and B accepts. This result obtains because A knows that B is rational and selfinterested and thus will always prefer something to nothing. Since B will
accept even the smallest amount, A, who is also rational and self-interested, will propose it in order to maximize her own payoff.
The Ultimatum Game has been tested in various settings with relatively large sums of money (in some experiments the amount represents
more than three months' income for the participants) and the result directly contradicts the self-interest hypothesis. 96 The evidence shows that
any proposal less than 20% of the amount will be rejected with a 50%
probability. 9 7 Moreover, the probability of rejection decreases as the of95. The seminal paper is Werner Gfith et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum
Bargaining, 3 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 367 (1982). In addition to the Ultimatum Game,
other games were developed to test the self-interest hypothesis, including the Gift
Exchange Game, the Trust Game, and the Dictator Game. All of these games have the
salient feature of simplicity. Since the games are easy for experimental subjects to
understand, the inferences to be drawn regarding their motivations are more robust than
they would be were the games complex.
96. Elizabeth Hoffman et al., On Expectations and Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum
Games, 25 Int'lJ. Game Theory 289, 291-96 (1996); Ernst Fehr et al., Do High Stakes and
Competition Undermine Fairness? Evidence from Russia 2-4 (Inst. for Empirical Research
in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 120, July 2002), available at http://
www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwpl2O.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
Fehr et al., High Stakes].
97. Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra note 93, at 5.
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fer increases. 98 Thus, it seems clear that many responders do not behave
as the self-interest hypothesis predicts. They are prepared to reject offers
they perceive as unfair even at a cost to themselves. A further robust
result is that many proposers appear to anticipate that if they make a very
low offer, there is a high probability that it will be rejected. This result
has been confirmed by experiments in another simple game, the Dictator
Game, in which the responder has no choice but to accept the proposer's
offer. Results show that initial offers in the Ultimatum Game are substantially higher than in the Dictator Game, indicating that proposers apply
backward induction and anticipate retaliation against unfair proposals. 99
The Ultimatum Game demonstrates that a substantial number of the
experimental subjects are willing to punish unfair behavior even though
the action is costly to them. Another game, the Gift Exchange Game,
demonstrates that a large number of responders will voluntarily reward
actions that they perceive as generous or fair.'(10 In the Gift Exchange
Game, the proposer offers a sum of money between one and ten units
(imagine that it is a salary offer). The responder can either accept or
reject the offer. If she rejects, both subjects receive nothing. If the responder accepts, she must then expend some amount of effort (think of
it as job performance) that is costly to her. Standard rational choice theory predicts an equilibrium in which the responder will always choose the
lowest possible effort level. (Why try any harder than you have to when
effort is costly?) Anticipating this, the proposer will always propose the
lowest possible salary offer. But again, the results directly contradict the
self-interest hypothesis. All of the studies confirm that the average effort
is positively correlated to the offered wage. This implies that responders,
on average, will reward generous salary offers with generous efforts (even

when it is costly for them to do so)." ' I
98. Colin F. Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, J.
Econ. Persp., Spring 1995, at 209, 211; Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments, in
Handbook of Experimental Economics 253, 256-58 (Alvin E. Roth & John H. Kage eds.,
1995).
99. Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra note 93, at 6; see also Alvin E.
Roth et al., Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and
Tokyo: An Experimental Study, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 1068, 1093-94 (1991).
100. Ernst Fehr et al., Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental
Investigation, 108 Q.J. Econ. 437, 450-53 (1993) [hereinafter Fehr et al., Market
Clearing]; Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra note 93, at 6-7.
101. Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra note 93, at 6-7; see Fehr et al.,
Market Clearing, supra note 100; cf. Gary Charness, Responsibility and Effort in an
Experimental Labor Market, 42 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 375 (2000); Ernst Fehr & Armin
Falk, Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market, 107 J. Pol. Econ. 106
(1999) (showing that employees' effort is positively correlated with wage level such that
lowered wages prompt decreased employee effort); Ernst Fehr et al., Gift Exchange and
Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets, 42 Eur. Econ. Rev. 1 (1998) (showing
that sellers' tendency to reciprocate generates positive relationship between prices offered
by buyers and quality levels offered by sellers); Simon Gaichter & Armin Falk, Reputation
and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation, 104 Scandinavian J. Econ. 1
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These experiments yield two important conclusions. First, the data
show that the subjects in these experiments are heterogeneous: Some
individuals cooperate voluntarily and some do not. In all of these games,
the data are remarkably robust in showing considerable individual differences among the subjects. Thus, for example, while a significant fraction
of responders in the Gift Exchange Game repay generous offers with generous efforts (the data across experiments are remarkably consistent that
about 40% are "fair" types), a substantial fraction (again consistently
ranging between 40 and 60%) also always make purely selfish effort
choices."' 2 But despite the presence of heterogeneous responders (some
fair, some selfish), the fraction of fair responders is sufficiently high to
make a high salary offer profitable to the proposer.
Second, it is important to emphasize that the interactions in all of
these games are one-shot, isolated exchanges. The subjects do not know
each other and only interact once, anonymously. Thus, the behaviors
that are revealed in the experiments, especially the preference for reciprocity held by a fraction of the subjects, must be distinguished from patterns of cooperation that are revealed in iterated games. Patterns of cooperation and investment in ongoing relationships are perfectly
consistent with self-interest. On the other hand, reciprocity in one-shot
10 3
interactions directly contradicts the self-interest hypothesis.
B. Toward a Theory of Reciprocal Fairness
Can the results of these experiments be explained by relaxing the
assumption that all individuals are exclusively motivated by self-interest?
There are several candidates for a theory of fairness that focus on the
distributionaleffects of any interaction. 1° 4 Thus, for example, one can hypothesize that some fraction of parties are motivated by altruism; that is,
their utility increases with the well-being of other people. Altruism explains the generous behavior of responders in gift exchange games, but it
is clearly inconsistent with the evidence that some players retaliate and
hurt other subjects even when it is costly for them to do so. 10 5 An alternative hypothesis is that some subjects are motivated by envy; that is, they
care not only about their absolute wealth but also about their relative
(2002) (showing that employees' increased effort in response to increased wages is greater
over repeated transactions than in one-shot agreements).
102. Fehr & Falk, Psychological Foundations, supra note 93, at 687, 691 n.4
(reviewing experimental evidence).
103. Id. at 690 & n.2.
104. The utility functions of individuals with social preferences depend not only on
their own material payoffs but also on how many material resources are allocated to others.
Given these preferences, the actors are assumed to behave perfectly rationally and thus
traditional game theoretic models can be used to predict equilibrium outcomes. Fehr &
Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra note 93, at 6-7.
105. Id. at 13-14.
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standing as compared to others.11° 6 This preference for envy is just the
opposite of altruism. It means that a player suffers if she gets less than
the other party but does not care about the other party if she gets more.
Thus, while envy explains retaliation in ultimatum games and gift exchange games, it does not explain the generous behavior in those
interactions.
Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt have developed a theory of inequity
aversion that captures the key results in the experimental games and
combines the features of both altruism and envy.' 0 7 Under this theory, a
person is altruistic to other players if her payoffs are above an equitable
benchmark and is envious of others if their payoffs exceed that benchmark. In other words, people compare themselves with others in their
group (or with the other player in two-person games) by using a benchmark of equality of distribution. Inequity aversion thus can explain both
generous and punitive actions toward others.'
A second approach to the fairness problem focuses not on the distributional effects of an interaction but on the intent that can be inferred
from those effects. This "intention-based reciprocity" assumes that a person cares about the intentions of the other party to a bilateral interaction.
If the other party treats her kindly, then she wants to return the favor; but
if the other party treats her unfairly, then she acts to punish unfair behavior. Thus, in this approach, the key is how a person interprets the actions
of the other party.' 9 Intuitively, it would seem that the intention to be
fair plays an important role in many facets of life, independent of the
distributive consequences themselves. And indeed, recent experiments
provide clear support for the behavioral relevance of the intent of the
actor.I "' These experiments show that, in assessing whether or not an
action is fair, the subjects consider the intention that is signaled by the
action as well as the distributive consequences of the action."II Both factors are germane. There is still evidence of reciprocity where subjects are
106. See id. at 14 (noting that this "relative income" hypothesis has long lineage in
economics and tracing it back to Thorstein Veblen).
107. See Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, supra note 93.
108. Id.
109. Rabin, supra note 93. These intention-based interactions cannot be modeled
under traditional game theory but require a more complex and less tractable framework
known as psychological game theory. See Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra
note 93, at 18-20.
110. E.g., Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Testing Theories of FairnessIntentions Matter (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper
No. 63, Sept. 2000), available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp063.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review). To isolate the role of intent, Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher
devised an experiment involving two sets of proposers. Proposers from one set were able
to signal their intent to the responders by choosing from a range of offers from unfair to
generous. Members of the other set of proposers could not signal intent because their
"offers" were chosen randomly and the responders knew that the proposers were not
responsible for the offer decision. Id. at 6-8.
111. Id. at 16.
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unable to signal intent, but the level of reciprocity is significantly en112
hanced where the actor can infer the intention of the other player.
Let us summarize, then, the key elements in formulating a theory of
reciprocal fairness that is consistent with this substantial body of experimental evidence: First, many individuals behave reciprocally toward
others in ways that deviate from purely self-interested behavior. In response to generous actions, many individuals are much more cooperative
than rational choice theory would predict, and many individuals are
more vengeful than their self-interest demands in responding to actions
they perceive as unfriendly.' 13 Second, individuals repay gifts and exact
punishment even in costly interactions with strangers in which the action
will produce no material rewards. 114 Finally, this is a heterogeneous
world. Some individuals exhibit reciprocal fairness and others exhibit
pure self-interest. Taking all the experiments together from such diverse
countries as Austria, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Russia, and the United
States, the fraction of reciprocally fair subjects ranges from 40 to 60% as
115
does the fraction of subjects who are selfish. "
C. Testing Reciprocal Fairness in Incomplete Contracts
What, then, does a theory of reciprocal fairness tell us about the optimal design of contracts? To see the theory's relevance, consider the following example: Assume that a buyer in New York is interested in acquiring a single shipment of the highest quality carved rosewood furniturecoffee tables, trunks, chests, etc.-from India. The buyer anticipates using this shipment in a one-shot promotion of luxury home furnishings
that she is planning to market for the holiday season. In a perfect world,
the buyer would visit a market in New York, survey the imported rosewood, and purchase the highest quality at the price prevailing for such
goods. Unfortunately, no such market exists, so the buyer must contract
to purchase the furniture from a seller in India. The buyer has never
dealt with the seller before and she does not anticipate doing so again.
There are two alternative contracts the buyer might propose. One
option is to propose an obligationally complete contract (that is, a contract in which the parties condition performance on all verifiable infor112. Id. at 2.
113. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gchter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
Reciprocity, J. Econ. Persp., Summer 2000, at 159, 159 [hereinafter Fehr & Gachter,
Fairness and Retaliation].
114. Id.
115. This heterogeneity is critical to understanding the apparent anomaly between
bilateral interactions where evidence of reciprocal fairness is robust and experiments in
competitive markets where almost all subjects behave as if they were self-interested. The
economic environment determines the preference type that is decisive. Thus, in a
competitive market a few selfish players can drive the price to the competitive level and no
single fair person can affect that price. On the other hand, in bilateral interactions, the
presence of a fraction of inequity-averse players can create incentives for selfish types to
make fair offers. See Fehr & Schmidt, Fairness and Reciprocity, supra note 93, at 38-40.
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mation and discard only nonverifiable information). Assume that high
quality can be observed but not verified to a court, but that a court is able
to verify that the goods do not meet merchantable quality-in other
words, a court can determine that the delivered quality is unacceptable
under that legal standard.' 16 This option thus requires the buyer to specify the quantity of furniture required, set a quality level of ordinary
merchantability, and propose to pay the market price commensurate with
that quality (say $50,000). This contract is legally enforceable and,
should the Indian seller deliver goods of less than merchantable quality,
the buyer can recover expectation damages (although costs and attorneys
fees would not be recouped). 17 Moreover, since the seller will charge
the market price for merchantable quality goods, much of the contractual surplus (representing the value to the buyer of having goods of at
least merchantable quality for its promotion) is retained by the buyer.
There is a second option. The buyer can instead propose an intentionally indefinite contract. This agreement proposes a lower base price
(say $40,000) for goods that are sold "As Is," subject only to a minimum
contract description. "' In addition, the buyer promises to pay a bonus
of as much as $20,000 if the seller delivers high quality goods satisfactory
to the buyer. Here, in other words, the buyer is offering potentially to
share a portion of the greater contractual surplus with the seller in return
for the enhanced effort necessary to produce the specialized goods that
maximize the buyer's value. But this proposal has a twist. The base price
term in this incomplete contract would be enforceable (assuming the
seller delivered goods meeting the contract description), but under the
common law indefiniteness doctrine, neither any additional effort expended by the seller nor the buyer's promise to give a bonus if satisfied is
legally enforceable. Thus, there is a risk that the buyer will receive poor
116. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a) (2002) provides that goods must be "at least such as
[would] pass without objection in the trade under the contract description." Thus, under
this standard the court can determine if the attributes of the goods are consistent with the
contract description and also are "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are

used" under the general legal standard of merchantable quality. § 2-314(2)(c). The
assumption that merchantable goods are verifiable can be stated formally. Suppose that a
seller could produce quality at varying levels. Denote the realized quality as q and the
distribution of possible quality levels from which q is drawn as {ql,.. . q ... q,}, where qa
is the average quality. Assume that any q < %,is verifiable, but the court cannot determine
the quality level of anything that is above that verifiable standard. The parties could then
write a contract that requires the seller to deliver the quality level q. at the market price p,,.
117. §§ 2-714(2), -715; Scott & Kraus, supra note 27, at 1109-22.
118. Under an "As Is" contract, the seller makes no warranties of quality, see U.C.C.
§ 2-316(3) (a), but the seller is responsible for delivering goods meeting the basic contract
description (e.g., "six rosewood tables, four carved trunks," etc.), see § 2-313(1) (b) ("Any
description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the description."). Comment 4 to § 2-313
explains that a clause generally disclaiming all warranties of quality under § 2-316 (such as
an "As Is" disclaimer) cannot reduce the seller's obligation to supply goods sufficient to
meet the contract description.
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quality goods for which she must pay $40,000 (which is her lowest value
contract).
Which contract will maximize the expected contractual surplus? It is
tempting to suggest that the obligationally complete contract, with a legally enforceable quality term, is on average more likely to maximize expected joint returns. While the first-best contract would have the seller
deliver high quality, high value goods and receive a total payment (including the bonus) of $60,000, the downside risk is that the seller will
instead deliver low quality, low value goods and demand the $40,000 contract price. This risk exists because the indefinite agreement precludes a
legal action against the seller should he deliver low quality goods that
nevertheless meet the minimum contract specifications. Since high quality is not verifiable, the first-best option is not contractable. The best
available option, therefore, seems to be the legally enforceable contract
for merchantable quality goods at a $50,000 price.
This conclusion is strongly supported by rational choice theory. A
game theorist would predict that under the indefinite bonus contract the
Indian seller will deliver goods that meet the verifiable contract description (in order to recover the $40,000 contract price) but will choose a low
effort level, thus delivering lower quality goods. This is because expending extra effort in producing higher quality goods is costly and the extra
effort will not earn a compensating bonus payment. The bonus promise
is discretionary and thus a self-interested buyer will always decline to pay
any bonus regardless of the efforts expended by the seller.
But do these predictions hold if preferences for fairness and reciprocity are taken into account? Under a fairness regime, the more complete, legally enforceable contract is likely to result in a relatively unequal
distribution of the surplus. If the Indian seller is concerned about this,
he could punish the buyer in two ways. First, as in an ultimatum game, he
could simply reject the contract, in which case both parties would receive
a zero payoff. Second, the seller could accept the contract offer but punish the buyer's unfairness by shirking on the effort to produce merchantable quality goods, thus necessitating costly litigation to enforce the
agreement. On the other hand, the very same preferences for fairness
and reciprocity that might lead a seller to retaliate against unfair behavior
would actually enhance the performance of the more incomplete agreement. A fair buyer in this situation will reciprocate a high effort level
from the seller by paying a generous bonus. Moreover, assuming that the
fraction of fair types in the general population is consistent with the experimental evidence, the probability of a fair bonus being paid is sufficiently great to motivate the seller (regardless of his type) to expend the
extra effort. Thus, if a substantial fraction of the population responds to
opportunities to reciprocate, we would predict that the indefinite bonus
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contract would actually produce a better result for both parties than the
more complete, legally enforceable contract.' 19
What do the experimental results show? Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt
have designed an experiment involving a single interaction that tests the
choice between an incomplete bonus contract that relies on reciprocity
and a more complete incentive contract that monitors performance
under the threat of costly legal enforcement. '2 0 In the experiment, each
principal was matched randomly and anonymously with a different agent.
119. This result can be stated formally. Assume that 0 _ a 5 1 of the buyer population
are fair types in the sense that these buyers will reciprocate a fair offer from the seller and
comply with their promises even if the promises are legally unenforceable. Sellers know a,
but do not know whether the particular buyer they face is fair or unfair. The buyer's
valuation for the product v is v, for the merchantable quality good and vh for the high
quality good with associated prices p, and ph respectively. The indefinite contract should
be written only when it would be socially efficient, which is when it would generate a
greater surplus than the enforceable contract such that Vh - Ph > v, - pl. The seller's cost of
producing high quality is c and the cost of producing low quality is normalized to zero. Let
qh denote the high quality good and q, the low quality good. Recalling that quality is
observable, the buyer offers the following contract:
I. p, + (ph - pi) = ph for qh
II. p, for q,
The bonus is ph - pl, which the fair buyer pays when the seller delivers high quality. Since
quality is unverifiable, the unfair buyer will pay only p regardless of what the seller delivers.
Now consider the seller's problem when a buyer offers this contract. The seller will
produce high quality when:
apt, + (I - a)p - c _ P
The first term on the left hand side is the expected gain from a fair buyer (the probability a
buyer is fair times the high quality price); the second term is the expected gain from a
cheating buyer (the probability a buyer is a cheater times the low quality price); and the
third term is the cost of high quality. The seller can produce low quality costlessly and get
the low price, which is the right hand side. This simplifies to:
a(ph - pi) > c
The left hand side is the expected marginal gain from producing high quality and the right
hand side is the cost. Rearranging terms, the seller will produce high quality when:
c

Ph - P1
Holding constant the percentage of fair buyers, sellers are more likely to produce high
quality when the cost of doing so is low-c is small-and when the premium that buyers
will pay for high quality is large-the denominator is large. Holding the right hand side
constant, sellers are more likely to produce high quality when the fraction of fair buyers is
high-a is large. Assuming contracting costs are zero, all buyers will offer the contract
described here. This is because the fair buyer is happy to pay for high quality and the
unfair buyer is happy to cheat if he gets high quality. So ex ante the bonus contract is in
every buyer's self interest; only fair buyers will comply, however. In addition, the seller is
not trusting the buyer with whom she deals. Rather, she is making a profit-maximizing
decision given her knowledge of the percentage of fair buyers and the other parameters.
So sellers will sometimes produce high quality and sometimes not.
120. Ernst Fehr et al., Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness 1-2 (Inst.
for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 72, Feb. 2001),
available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewp072.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Fehr et al., Incompleteness].
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The principal had to choose between an incomplete contract, where an
initial wage offer was enforceable but both effort and bonus were discretionary, and a more complete contract with explicit incentives for effort
and enforceable (and costly) sanctions for nonperformance. 21 Ninety
percent of the principals chose the bonus contract. Some principals did
not pay a bonus, but a significant fraction did respond generously to
higher levels of effort from the agents by paying an appropriate bonus.
Thus, the average bonus increased significantly and proportionately with
the level of effort provided. This made it worthwhile for agents (whether
fair or selfish) to put forth much greater effort than the self-interest hypothesis would predict. Indeed, the average amount of effort induced by
the bonus contract was two and a half times that which was induced by
the explicit, legally enforceable contract. 122 Thus, on average, the incomplete bonus contract produced a much higher average payoff to both
23
parties. 1
These experiments demonstrate that powerful incentives can be
stimulated in a very incomplete contract between total strangers who may
never interact again. Rather than using explicit sanctions, the incomplete contract relies on reciprocal fairness as an enforcement device. Importantly, the incomplete contract does better precisely because it is in121. In a typical session, twelve principals and twelve agents play for ten periods. In
each period, an agent faces a different principal. A period consists of three stages. At
stage one, the principal has to decide between the explicit or implicit contract. The
implicit contract specifies a fixed wage and a desired effort level (between one and ten)
that is costly to the agent. In addition, the principal can promise a bonus that may be paid
after actual effort has been observed. There is no contractual obligation to pay the
announced bonus, nor is the agent obliged to choose the desired effort level, but the
principal is committed to paying the fixed wage. The explicit contract also specifies a
binding fixed wage and a desired level of effort. Here, however, the principal can impose a
fine that has to be paid to the principal in case of verifiable shirking. The verification cost
is fixed. At stage two, the agent observes which contract has been offered and decides
whether to accept or reject the offer. If the agent rejects the offer, the game ends and
both parties receive a zero payoff. If the agent accepts, she then chooses the actual level of
effort. At stage three, the principal observes the actual effort. If the principal has chosen
the implicit contract, he then decides whether to award a bonus payment to the agent. If
the principal offered the explicit contract and the agent's effort falls short of the agreed
level, a random draw decides with a probability of one-third whether shirking is verifiable,
in which case the agent has to pay the fine. If all players are purely self-interested there is a
straightforward result. A selfish principal never pays a bonus. Anticipating this, the agent
only provides the minimum effort of one. If the principal chooses the explicit contract,
the principal should choose the maximum fine because this is the best deterrent against
potential shirking. The parameters of the experiment are chosen such that a risk neutral
and selfish agent maximizes expected utility by choosing an effort level of four if faced with
the maximum fine. Since the enforceable effort level is only one under the implicit
contract, the model predicts that principals prefer the explicit contract. Id. at 5-8.
122. Id. at 21-23.
123. The more complete, explicit contract produces a lower payoff, all else equal,
because shirking is costly to monitor, verify, and sanction. The bonus contract stimulates
greater efforts from agents because a principal's promise to pay a conditional bonus is
credible and principals incur no enforcement costs. See id. at 20.
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complete and thus leaves more freedom for the parties to reciprocate. By
simply assuming the presence of a substantial fraction of reciprocally fair
individuals, this anomalous result becomes predictable: The indefinite
bonus contract will produce an outcome significantly closer to the firstbest objective than will the more complete, legally enforceable contract.
To be sure, this enforcement mechanism is not perfect and, depending
on the fraction of reciprocal types in the population, it can fail. Yet the
experimental evidence strongly suggests that the effect of reciprocal fairness, an effect that thus far has been neglected in contract theory, is an
important element in optimal contract design.
D. A Critique of Fairness Theory: Issues of External Validity
Notwithstanding the predictive power of reciprocal fairness in experimental settings, the theory has yet to be tested seriously in real world
contexts. Thus, any use of fairness theory still raises the question of external validity: To what extent do the experimental results predict how economic actors will behave in the real world? There are four major challenges to the validity of this evidence in explaining real world contracting
behavior and in formulating legal policy.
1. Size of Stakes. - First is the question of whether the stakes in experimental games are sufficiently high to simulate the response of real
world actors in commercial contracts. It seems intuitively plausible, for
example, that a preference for reciprocal fairness may become weaker
when the monetary stakes are higher. Despite that intuition, however,
experiments with relatively high stakes have shown patterns of reciprocity
similar to the low-stakes experiments. Lisa Cameron tested the impact of
high stakes on negative reciprocity (the willingness to punish unfair behavior) with subjects in Indonesia. In a high stakes Ultimatum Game
(representing over three months' income to the subjects), she found no
variation in proposers' initial offers and only a slight increase in the ac12 4
ceptance rate of low offers by responders.
More recently, experiments in Russia in a Gift Exchange Game have
tested the impact of high stakes on positive reciprocity (the willingness to
reward fair behavior). In these experiments, the subjects earned on average between two and three months' income. The study found that a tenfold increase in the size of the stakes had little impact on either the initial
wage offer of the "employers" or the reciprocal effort levels of the "workers."' 12 5 It is possible, of course, that experiments with extremely high
stakes would reveal greater deviations from the predictions of fairness
theory, but, absent that data, a casual review of the relative size of the
124. Lisa A. Cameron, Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental
Evidence from Indonesia, 37 Econ. Inquiry 47, 55 (1999).
125. See Fehr et al., High Stakes, supra note 96, at 9-14 & figs.] & 2, tbl.2 (testing
sixty undergraduates at engineering college).
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contractual surplus in the sample cases does not suggest that the real
world stakes would, by themselves, undermine the theory.
2. Untrained Individuals Versus Trained Managers as Experimental
Subjects. - The second critique of the experimental evidence is particularly relevant to the use of fairness theory to explain the behavior of contracting parties: All of the experimental subjects are individuals and not
firms. Thus, it is unclear to what extent the observed behaviors, even if
they apply to the general population, are relevant to contracts between
business entities. One might speculate, for example, that individuals in
laboratory experiments may respond differently from officers of firms because the experimental subjects are not subject to the same pressures to
make profit-maximizing decisions. Moreover, some recent evidence suggests that cognitive "errors" can be mitigated substantially and even be
made to disappear when individuals are asked to perform as actors in
firms,' 2 6 or when the institutional structures permit communication
12 7
within a group of actors and/or require competition between actors.
It is important to know the nature of the contracting parties in any particular transaction, therefore, before reciprocal fairness can be advanced
confidently as an explanation for the observed behavior. As table 2
shows, nearly 50% of the unenforceable agreements in the sample involved either individuals or closely-held firms on both sides of the transaction, and in over 75% of the cases one of the parties was either an individual or an owner-manager. In only thirteen cases were both litigants large
corporate entities. Thus, the contracting behaviors observed in the cases
reflect, in general, the preferences of individual actors and not those of
corporate officers acting in an agency capacity.
3. Artificiality of ExperimentalSetting. - The third objection to generalizing these findings to real world contracting behavior is that the subjects
(who are typically university undergraduates) may be playing a different
game than that of real world actors. For instance, the fair behavior that is
observed in the experiments might be driven by the fact that th experimenters can observe the subjects' actions and students may not want to
appear selfish or greedy to their professors. But this speculation seems
inconsistent with the basic finding of heterogeneity. There are, after all,
significant individual differences observed in the subjects' behavior. The
substantial fraction of subjects who exhibit selfish behavior seem unconcerned about their professors' opinions. Moreover, when experimenters
conducted a Gift Exchange Game where effort levels were set exoge126. See Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency
Relationships, 31 J. Legal Stud. 1, 33 (2002) (finding that corporate agency relationship
reduces cognitive errors due to endowment effect).
127. See Tilman Slembeck &Jean-Robert Tyran, Do Institutions Promote Rationality?
An Experimental Study of the Three-Door Problem 3 (Univ. of St. Gallen, Discussion
Paper No. 2002-21, Sept. 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/
SSRNID345721_code021114500.pdPabstractid=345721) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting that combination of communication and competition completely
eliminates anomalous choice in "three-door" problem).
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nously, the wage offers were uniformly "unfair" and approached the predictions of the self-interest hypothesis, suggesting that any concern with
2 8
appearing selfish is rather easily overcome.1
In the same vein, however, one might ask whether experimentally
observed reciprocal fairness is evidence of a universal pattern of behavior
or whether an individual's economic and social background may influence her preferences for fairness. And, if individual circumstances influence preferences, is reciprocal behavior better explained by an individual's attributes (sex, age, or relative wealth) or by the attributes of the
group or culture to which she belongs? A recent cross-cultural study using the Ultimatum Game in fifteen small-scale societies found that the
self-interest hypothesis fails in each society studied.129 But the study did
show significant cross-cultural differences, both in the equity of offers and
the rate of rejections. The findings suggest that observed differences are
attributable to group-specific conditions such as social institutions or cultural fairness norms. Specifically, the study shows that the greater the
payoff from cooperation in economic production for people in the society and the more those people rely on market exchange in their daily
lives the greater the degree of fairness behaviors (e.g., cooperation, sharing, and punishment). 3 0 This last study is relevant to an inquiry into the
causes of deliberately incomplete contracts; it suggests that contracts written in advanced market economies will exhibit high levels of reciprocal
fairness behaviors. The higher the fraction of fair types in the population, all else equal, the more efficient is reciprocal fairness as a means of
contract enforcement.
4. Reciprocity as Learned Self-Interest. - The final objection is related
to this last point. The experimental evidence does not show whether observed preferences for reciprocity are inherent characteristics or learned
behaviors, or whether they simply represent the failure of self-interested
parties to adapt cooperative behavior that works well in repeated interactions to one-shot laboratory interactions. After all, individuals' decision
strategies have to work in real world transactions and not in economics
experiments. So it would be hardly surprising if individuals devise strategies-or heuristics-that do work in real world transactions, and then fail
to adjust those strategies to the pure single iteration game in the laboratory. Or, to put it another way, rather than being equally divided between self-interested individuals and reciprocally fair ones, the world may
be divided between self-interested individuals who know how to adjust
their life strategies in laboratory games and those who don't.
Another possibility is that cultures generate norms of reciprocity that
tend to promote individual self-interest. People adhere to the norms be128. Fehr et al., High Stakes, supra note 96, at 2.
129. Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments
in 15 Small-Scale Societies, Am. Econ. Rev.: AEA Papers and Proceedings, Special Edition
May 2001, at 73, 77.
130. Id. at 76-77.
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cause they believe in them as norms, but the norms themselves are consistent with self-interest, except in laboratory experiments. This is because,
over time, parties will be better off if they behave fairly. Following the
"over time" heuristic consistently, not making distinctions for what appear to be single-iteration games, may be a successful, maximizing strategy. After all, sometimes one might mistake a repeat-play game for a single-iteration game and get punished, or one might pay some unexpected
reputational price. Thus, it is possible that a rational utility-maximizer
could easily behave in the way the experimental economists describe as
reciprocally fair (and not utility-maximizing) simply because the economists are not thinking about the costs of categorizing, and miscategorizing, transactions. In short, there may be no clear conflict between selfinterest and the participants' observed behavior. Reciprocal fairness may
not undermine the self-interest hypothesis as much as extend its reach.
This argument is quite plausible, indeed, even persuasive, but it is
irrelevant for the purposes of understanding self-enforcing agreements.
The important point is that all the available evidence suggests that a substantial fraction of individuals act as if they were reciprocally fair in isolated interactions with relative strangers. Whatever the source of that behavior (whether learned, normative, or intrinsic), it is quite relevant to
understanding the contracting choices of real world individuals in developed market economies who write intentionally incomplete contracts.
The apparent congruence between the experimental evidence and the
factual context of the litigated cases thus justifies a further analysis in Part
III of the fit between the predictions of fairness theory and the observed
behavior of contracting parties.
III.

EXPLAINING INTENTIONALLY INCOMPLETE AGREEMENTS

Assume, for the moment, that the experimental evidence of a heterogenous world populated by both self-interested and reciprocally-fair individuals accurately captures the external reality. This evidence of reciprocal fairness then poses two central questions for the legal regulation of
indefinite agreements: Why do parties write intentionally incomplete
agreements? And is the presumption of nonenforcement reflected in the
common law rule of indefiniteness defensible?
A. Why Do Parties Write Intentionally Incomplete Contracts?
The sample case data suggest that the incidence of intentionally incomplete agreements is significant. Roughly 240 cases were litigated over
a five-year period and nearly 40% of the sample cases consisted of intentionally incomplete agreements.' 3 1 The incidence of litigation might be
explained by the hypothesis that the failure to write legally enforceable
contracts in transactions of this type actually increases the risk of litigation, and thus the sample represents a larger fraction of the population
131. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
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of such contracts than would be the case with litigation over otherwise
enforceable contracts. This hypothesis implies that there is a selection
bias: The litigated cases are more likely to require complex moral judgments about the nature of the promisor's obligations and the conditions
precedent to performance. Thus, the parties are unable to settle their
dispute because of fundamental disagreements about the nature of their
respective commitments. But the data from the sample cases show, to the
contrary, that these agreements are relatively simple in form, clear in
commitment, and thus free from moral ambiguity. Therefore, we should
discard this hypothesis.
An alternative hypothesis, and the one advanced in this Article, is
that parties frequently write indefinite agreements because they are a
more efficient method of contracting than the alternative. Generalizing
from the cases, this hypothesis implies that contracting parties frequently
discard verifiable measures of performance in favor of agreements that
condition on nonverifiable measures in order to enhance the contractual
32
surplus. 1'
The efficiency hypothesis thus implies that deliberately indefinite agreements are ubiquitous and that the litigated cases, representing
instances where the transaction broke down, are a relatively smaller set of
the total population of such agreements than would be the case with litigation over enforceable contracts.' 3 But the efficiency hypothesis seems
inconsistent with the basic axioms of contract theory that contracting parties do not contract over nonverifiable measures of performance and,
conversely, do contract over verifiable measures of performance where
transaction costs are relatively low.
To resolve this apparent contradiction, it is helpful to remember that
the axioms of contract theory are premised on the assumption that the
contract in question falls outside the self-enforcing range. Thus, verifiability is relevant only when legal enforcement is necessary in order to
make the parties' promises credible. The puzzle of why parties appear to
prefer nonverifiable agreements over verifiable contracts can be solved,
therefore, if these agreements are self-enforcing and if the self-enforcing
34
mechanism is more efficient than the alternative of legal enforcement.
132. Theorists have proposed several possible explanations for why parties might not
contract over some verifiable factors. One obvious possibility is that the transaction costs
of specifying all the possible verifiable states of the world may exceed any expected
benefits. Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56
Econometrica 755, 776 (1988). Transaction costs do not explain the experimental results
discussed in Part IIC, however, where subjects who can costlessly elect legal enforcement
of verifiable terms instead choose unenforceable bonus agreements.
133. To be sure, there is a general problem of selection bias that suggests caution in
generalizing from a population of decided cases to the universe of such agreements. I
suggest below some plausible reasons why parties might seek to litigate such a low
probability claim. See infra text accompanying notes 139-143. But the fact that the
direction of any bias is uncertain does lend some credibility to the assumption that the
incidence of such informal indefinite agreements is significant.
134. There is a familiar argument that legal enforcement and self-enforcement
regulate different aspects of the contractual relationship. On this view, legal enforcement
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The difficulty is that most of the sample cases of intentionally indefinite
contracts appear to fall outside the self-enforcing range as that domain is
traditionally understood. The transactions are predominantly one-shot
interactions between relative strangers. 35 A number of the cases do involve parties with some prior association and with a prospect of repeat
transactions in the future, but reputation and repeat dealings appear, by
36
themselves, insufficient to ensure that the agreement will be honored.1
The question, then, is whether reciprocal fairness is sufficient, either by
itself or in combination with reputation and repeat play, to make the respective promises credible.
1. Reciprocal Fairness and Indefinite Bonus Agreements. - Consider the
"indefinite bonus agreements" discussed above in Part I.C.2. Recall that
the cases reflect a recurring pattern where a principal offers an agent a
base compensation and requests an additional, nonverifiable performance in return for the promise of a nonverifiable bonus. To make a persuasive case for reciprocal fairness (given our empirical assumptions), we
need to resolve two subsidiary questions. First, if the parties do not intend their agreements to be legally enforceable, why do they invest resources in negotiating these agreements, frequently reducing their respective promises to a signed writing? To be sure, a promise made by a
reciprocally fair person is inherently credible and thus worth bargaining
for. Such a person has a social preference for fairness and is prepared to
bear costs to achieve an equitable outcome between the parties. But both
fair and selfish parties will make the same promises. The bonus offer
itself is thus not a signal of one's type (fair or selfish) because both fair

functions much as a nuclear umbrella, deterring breach in those states of the world where
the payoffs from breach are substantial and exceed the range of self-enforcement. The
other side of the argument is that where the payoffs are relatively low, and reputation and
repeated interactions are effective, they are a more efficient "conventional" deterrent. See
Eggleston, Posner & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 116 (arguing that "[r]eputational effects,
combined with renegotiation as circumstances change," explain relative efficiency of
simple contracts); Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra note 10, at 2044-48 (concluding
that extralegal norms and legal rules "regulate different aspects of the contractual
relationship in much the same way as conventional and nuclear weapons deter against
different acts of aggression and noncooperation by the superpowers").
135. See infra table 2. 1 coded thirty-seven of the fifty-five unenforceable cases in the
sample as discrete rather than relational contracts. While the coding involves some
judgment, in each of these cases the facts suggest that the parties entered into a single
transaction and that prior to the agreement they were relative strangers.
136. Recall that in heterogeneous markets reputation alone is an inadequate means
of credibly enforcing promises. See supra text accompanying notes 10-13. Even if others
can observe the interaction, they are unlikely to learn about the true reasons why the
particular transaction broke down. Without moral clarity, the mere fact of breakdown is
not sufficient to impose a reputational cost on either party. Moreover, although the
prospect of repeated interactions is always present to some degree, the discipline of
conditional cooperation (or "tit for tat") nevertheless depends on the present expectation
of a future payoff larger than the gains from defecting in the current transaction. Scott,
Conflict and Cooperation, supra note 10, at 2027-34.
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and selfish principals will promise the same bonus. 13 7 Nevertheless, given
the assumption of heterogeneity (i.e., nearly 40% of the population is
reciprocally fair), the promise of a bonus is not cheap talk. The bonus
promise is ex ante credible since there is a positive probability of a substantial bonus. Thus, the agent, whether fair or selfish, will exert nonver38
ifiable effort equal to the expected value of the bonus.'
This argument implies that parties to these agreements do not intend legal enforcement as a secondary deterrent if the transaction breaks
down. Thus, the second question: Why do they sue? One answer to this
question requires us to recall the Fehr and Schmidt theory of inequity
aversion. 13 9 Under their theory, fair types have a social preference for
equality of treatment which implies a willingness to share gains from
trade as well as a willingness to bear costs in order to punish inequity.
Reciprocally fair people, in other words, are not wimps. They punish selfish behavior. Even though ex ante there is a substantial probability of
reciprocity, the assumed proportion of selfish people in the population
implies that it will be necessary to mete out punishment from time to
time. Since both fair and selfish agents will exert some nonverifiable effort to earn a bonus, 14 1 the theory implies that breakdown will most often
occur when selfish principals fail to pay a bonus earned by nonverifiable
performance. This inference supports a testable prediction: Litigation
primarily occurs when a selfish principal fails to pay a bonus that the
agent has earned by nonverifiable performance. In such a case, fair
agents will be willing to bear costs in order to punish the principal. A fair
agent will be willing to sue even when the expected value of litigation is
negative.' 4 ' The evidence from the sample cases is consistent with this
137. Since a selfish principal can costlessly copy the promise to give a bonus, there is
no separating equilibrium. See Fehr et al., Incompleteness, supra note 120, at 12-14.
138. Note that one of the counterintuitive implications of the Fehr and Schmidt
model of inequity aversion is that a reciprocally fair agent will shirk more than will a selfish
agent. This is because the risk of not being paid a bonus by the principal is more costly for
a fair agent than it is for a selfish agent. A selfish agent will only bear the cost of
uncompensated effort if the bonus is not paid. But a reciprocally fair agent bears two
separate costs if the principal does not pay the bonus. In addition to the costs of
uncompensated efforts, this agent also feels worse because of her social preference for
equality. Thus, the inequity of the selfish principal receiving a more valuable performance
than he "paid for" is a further cost that reduces the expected value of the bonus to this
agent.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 107-108.
140. Recall, however, that the nonverifiable efforts of fair agents will be lower than
those of selfish agents. See supra note 138.
141. A self-interested plaintiff will not litigate unless the expected value of litigation is
positive-that is, where the probability of prevailing (P) multiplied by the expected
damages (D) minus the expected costs of litigation (C,,) is greater than zero (i.e., where
PD - Cp > 0). A fair agent, however, experiences the unfairness of the denied bonus as an
additional cost. A fair agent will litigate, therefore, so long as the probability of prevailing
(P) multiplied by the expected damages (D) plus the expected litigation costs to the
defendant (C,,) exceeds the expected costs of litigation to the plaintiff (C,)) (i.e., where PD
+ C, > C,,).
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prediction. In each of the indefinite bonus cases, the plaintiff is an agent
suing her principal for breach of contract and claiming the right to a
142
bonus earned by a nonverifiable performance.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the parties to these
agreements understand ex ante that there is such a low probability of
enforcement if the transaction breaks down. These are not agreements
where the parties have expressly announced their intention not to be legally bound. 14 3 Rather, the nature of these agreements-simple, clear
undertakings to treat the other party fairly-suggests that the parties are
relying on the potency of reciprocity rather than on the absence of legal
enforcement per se. Thus, a more plausible hypothesis is that, from the
parties' perspective, the ex ante prospect of legal enforcement is ambiguous. After all, a review of the cases would suggest to any lawyer that sometimes indefinite contracts are enforced and sometimes they are not. In
the absence of a systematic, functional analysis, of the sort I have undertaken in this Article, there is no reason to believe that the distinction
between deliberately incomplete agreements and other relational contracts would be obvious to the parties who are planning these transactions. By electing to leave the question of legal enforcement ambiguous,
the parties increase the credibility of the threat of punishment should a
selfish principal fail to pay a bonus to a deserving agent.
The discussion thus far suggests that reciprocal fairness offers a superior contracting alternative to legal enforcement even in one-shot interactions between relative strangers. The experimental evidence supports
three reasons why a self-enforcing bonus agreement is more efficient
than a legally enforceable contract that conditions only on verifiable measures of performance. First, legal enforcement is significantly more costly
than self-enforcement. Second, reciprocal fairness allows parties to make
credible promises regarding nonverifiable measures of performance, thus
increasing joint surplus. In the case of the indefinite bonus agreement,
the principal has two opportunities to encourage reciprocity-by increasing the initial base compensation and by promising a bonus. Finally,
142. To be sure, if the indefinite bonus contract were structured as a unilateral
contract-a promise to pay a bonus in return for enhanced efforts-the agent could not
be sued for failing to perform, as the principal did not request a return promise. However,
it is clear from the facts of most of the cases in the sample that the agreement was
structured bilaterally; that is, the agent promised to perform nonverifiable tasks and the
principal promised to pay a nonverifiable bonus. See, e.g., Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v.
Greenwich Capital Fin. Prods., Inc., 53 Fed. Appx. 510, 511 (10th Cir. 2002); Brines v.
XTRA Corp., 304 F.3d 699, 700-03 (7th Cir. 2002); Larson v. Johnson, 184 F. Supp. 2d 26,
30-31 (D. Me. 2002); Sugerman v. MCY Music World, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319-21
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Cleveland Wrecking Co. v. Hercules Constr. Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 287,
290 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Burns v. Dees, 557 S.E.2d 32, 34-35 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Smith v.
Hammons, 63 S.W.3d 320, 322 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); Lowinger v. Lowinger, 733 N.Y.S.2d
33, 35-36 (App. Div. 2001).
143. Express declarations of an intention not to be legally bound are common,
particularly in formal letters of intent. Indeed, such clauses, known as "Texaco clauses,"
have become standard in pre-closing documents. Johnston, supra note 46, at 404.
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these self-enforcing bonus agreements may help to solve a multitasking
problem in instances where the agent's performance involves both verifiable and nonverifiable tasks. Holmstrom and Milgrom have argued that,
in multitasking contexts, a flat wage rate for all tasks is more efficient
than a more complete, incentive contract that links compensation to verifiable tasks. 144 This is because linking verifiable performance measures
to compensation will cause the agent to substitute away from the nonverifiable tasks to the compensated verifiable tasks, thus impairing overall
performance. Self-enforcing bonus agreements "may avoid [this] inefficient effort allocation across tasks because the actual bonus can be made
dependent on the performance of the agent in all tasks." 1 4 5
2. Reciprocal Fairness and Repeated Interactions as Self-Enforcing Complements. - Even if self-enforcing bonus contracts are more efficient on average than legally enforceable contracts that condition only on verifiable
performance, the assumption of heterogeneity nevertheless implies a
higher variance in the returns for the self-enforcing alternative. If the
parties are risk neutral, the variance will not matter and they will predictably choose the more efficient contract. This is because variance measures risk, and risk neutral parties are indifferent to risk. 146 But one
might expect many of the individual contracting parties in the sample to
be risk averse. 1 47 The puzzle, then, is to figure out why individual contractors might strongly prefer the indefinite bonus alternative. 148 One
plausible hypothesis is that even though cooperative patterns based on
reputation and repeated interactions may be weak in any particular case,
individuals learn to reciprocate because reciprocation pays off in so many
ongoing transactions over time. This suggests that cooperative behavior
is self-reinforcing. Successful cooperation that generates a reputation for
trustworthiness or produces returns in ongoing transactions is consistent
with self-interest and also causes parties to learn to care more about the
other party's payoff. This, in turn, strengthens an individual's willingness

144. See Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses:
Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, J.L. Econ. & Org., Vol. 7 Special
Issue 1991, at 24, 24-27.
145. Fehr et al., Incompleteness, supra note 120, at 27 (emphasis omitted).
146. For readers not versed in statistics, variance is a measure of how far a particular
outcome may deviate from the mean of the distribution.
147. In eleven of the eighteen indefinite bonus cases, both of the parties were either
individuals or owner-managers of closely-held firms. See infra table 2.
148. It is tempting to suggest that the experimental subjects in the Fehr, Klein, and
Schmidt incomplete contract experiments were risk averse as well. However, while each
interaction was one-shot, a session of the incomplete contract experiments consisted of ten
different rounds against ten different contracting partners. See Fehr et al.,
Incompleteness, supra note 120, at 15. Thus, the experimental subjects playing the bonus
contract could presumably diversify across the entire session. Diversification is not as
readily accomplished in one-shot interactions in the real world.

20031

INDEFINITE AGREEMENTS

1681

to reciprocate voluntarily even where the prospect of repeat dealings is
49
quite low. 1
Moreover, in the transactions represented by the sample cases, other
cooperative influences are clearly present to some degree even if they
may not be sufficient by themselves to make the promises credible. Here
the hypothesis is that the various self-enforcing mechanisms-reputation,
repeated interactions, and reciprocity-are complements. There is some
experimental evidence that supports this claim. Brown, Falk, and Fehr
compared the effort levels of agents in a one-shot gift exchange game
with the effort levels in a similar game in which repeated interaction was
an additional, material incentive. 5 0° They found that effort levels in the
one-shot interaction were above the level predicted by pure self-interest
(thus implying a significant fraction of reciprocal agents) but that the
repeated interaction condition caused a significant increase in the effort
level. 15'
It is not entirely clear why this complementarity exists between repeated interactions and reciprocal fairness. One conjecture is that the
properties of incentives created by repeated interactions are very similar
to the properties of incentives created by invitations to reciprocate. Both
self-enforcing incentives are imposed implicitly and ex post while the incentives created by legal enforcement are imposed explicitly and ex
ante. 152 Thus, for example, in a repeat game framework a principal can
punish a selfish agent ex post without risking offending a cooperator by
announcing in advance a sanction for inadequate efforts.
Casual empiricism supports the hypothesis that self-enforcing mechanisms are complements and, especially in multitasking contexts, may
motivate parties to write indefinite bonus contracts. Perhaps the most
prevalent example of such contracts is in academic employment. Many, if
not most, academic employment contracts resemble the indefinite bonus
agreements described above. The principal (say a law school dean)
makes a legally binding base salary offer to the agent (the individual
faculty member). The salary is invariant to levels of effort above a bare
minimum verifiable performance (e.g., avoiding acts of moral turpitude
or a substantial failure of performance). But many verifiable measures of
performance are discarded (e.g., demonstrating basic teaching competence, prompt performance of specific governance responsibilities, and
participation in the intellectual life of the institution). At the same time,
149. Experiments by van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden indicate that successful
cooperation through repeated interactions strengthens the parties' willingness to take the
interests of others into account. Frans van Dijk et al., Social Ties in a Public Good
Experiment, 85 J. Pub. Econ. 275, 291 (2002).
150. Martin Brown, Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, Contractual Incompleteness and the
Nature of Market Interactions (Univ. of Zurich, Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ.,
Working Paper No. 38, Feb. 2002), available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/
iewwp038.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
151. Id. at 1-2.
152. See Fehr & Falk, Psychological Foundations, supra note 93, at 701-04.
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the principal requests additional nonverifiable performance (quality research, devoted attention to teaching, and shared governance responsibilities, etc.) and promises an indefinite bonus (merit raises in the future). Both the enhanced performance and the bonus are indefinite
terms and thus are not legally enforceable under the common law rule.
The standard academic contract is, therefore, largely self-enforcing.
Clearly, self-interested cooperation makes the respective promises at least
partially credible. Repeated interactions (merit raises awarded in the past
motivate nonverifiable performance in anticipation of raises in the future) as well as reputation (the dean's reputation for good judgment and
even-handedness) motivate nonverifiable performance by faculty. But
both reputation and repeated interactions are insufficient by themselves
to make the promises to perform and to reward performance fully credible. Faculty can move to other institutions thus creating an end-game
problem that undermines the discipline of repeated interactions. Moreover, reputation is relatively weak as a basis of enforcement because of
strong norms against sharing bonus information among faculty. Thus, it
is plausible that the additional incentive effects of reciprocity complement the self-enforcing patterns of cooperation based on reputation and
repeat play. In combination, these effects motivate a contractual design
that dominates the alternatives of a trust contract (lockstep raises) or an
enforceable incentive contract that ties compensation to verifiable tasks
such as the number of students taught or number of papers published
(creating a multitasking problem). 5 3 In these and similar settings, therefore, reciprocity reinforces other cooperative influences and thus offers
parties many more opportunities to use self-enforcing agreements rather
than legally enforceable contracts.
3. Comfort Agreements as Screen for Self-Enforcement. - The assumption
of heterogeneity-some folks behave fairly and some exhibit self-interest-implies that intentionally indefinite agreements (that rely exclusively on reciprocal fairness) are not first-best efficient. That conclusion
is supported by both the experimental evidence and the evidence of
transactional breakdown from the sample of litigated cases. The evidence of inefficiencies in self-enforcing bonus contracts may offer a plausible explanation for the common use of legally unenforceable "comfort
agreements." To understand why, recall from the sample data set that
these "comfort agreements" are deliberately indefinite agreements that
look to the formation of a future relationship. Some are in the form of
formal letters of intent but most are more informal agreements. 154 They

153. The statement in the text is confirmed by a survey of over one hundred law
school deans that I conducted while serving as President of the American Law Deans
Association from 1999-2001. More than 80% of the responding deans reported that
faculty compensation was determined by a base salary plus indefinite merit increases based
on nonverifiable efforts (high quality scholarship, teaching, etc.).
154. See infra table 2.
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include agreements to lease space in a shopping mall, 15 5 to execute an
executive compensation agreement, 156 to sell an insurance agency,' 57 to
59
enter into a partnership,1s 8 to license the construction of a golf course,
and to invest in a proposed gambling casino.' 60 In each case, the courts
have held that the indefinite terms in the comfort agreement constitute
an unenforceable "agreement to agree. " 161
The question we have posed earlier recurs: Why do parties write
these intentionally unenforceable agreements? It is well known that
more formal letters of intent are part of a continuous negotiation process. 162 The parties' intentions are to go to the next step and convert the
agreement into an enforceable contract. Typically, the enforceable contract is complex and final negotiation turns on several variables unknown
to the parties at the time the letter of intent is executed. In these cases,
63
therefore, the parties may be learning about each other's competence1
or waiting to see if a market shift makes the venture less attractive.' 64 But
most of the comfort agreements in the sample cases do not fit the conventional letter-of-intent model. The informal agreement and the future
transaction are commonly separated in time and are not part of an ongoing negotiation process. Moreover, the comfort agreement, like the indefinite bonus contract, is simple in form and offers clearly defined opportunities to reciprocate. 165 One hypothesis is that these agreements,
rather than (or in addition to) being designed for parties to learn about
each other's competence or about market conditions, are designed to
allow parties to learn about each other's taste for reciprocal fairness. To
be sure, self-enforcing bonus agreements are more efficient on average
than legally enforceable agreements that condition only on verifiable
measures of performance. But the assumption of heterogeneity means
that individual promisees risk responding with enhanced efforts to a selfish promisor who subsequently fails to pay any bonus. This inefficiency
could be reduced if the parties were able effectively to screen for reciprocally fair contracting partners.
155. OfficeMax, Inc. v. Sapp, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1083 (M.D. Ga. 2001).
156. Stout v. Fisher Indus., 603 N.W.2d 52, 54-55 (N.D. 1999).
157. Hunt v. Coker, 741 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
158. Bergman v. Delulio, 826 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
159. Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride Stables, 224 F.3d 1195, 1198 (10th Cir. 2000).
160. Mays v. Trump Ind., Inc., 255 F.3d 351, 354-55 (7th Cir. 2001).
161. See infra table 2.
162. See Johnston, supra note 46, at 449-50.
163. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 269-71 (Wis. 1965)
(franchisor increases capital contribution requirements following observation of potential
franchisee's trial period as store manager); Johnston, supra note 46, at 401-03.
164. See Ronald Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs and MAEs 42-44
(Apr. 30, 2003), at http://www.yale.edu/law/ccl/papers/merger15.pdf (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("The traditional [material adverse
change clause] permits a buyer to exit when a material adverse change or effect would
make the deal unprofitable for it.")
165. See supra text accompanying notes 78-85.
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The willingness to make an indefinite promise that conditions on
nonverifiable factors is not, by itself, a reliable signal that the promisor is
a reciprocally fair type. As we have seen, selfish promisors will copy the
signal since the invitation to reciprocate will induce greater efforts from
the promisee and thus greater returns to the promisor. But the typical
comfort agreement has an additional feature. The agreement itself creates opportunities to reciprocate in advance of the formalization of the
relationship between the parties. Recall, for example, the facts of Hunt v.
Coker,166 where the parties entered into a comfort agreement expressing
their joint desire for Coker to sell, and Hunt to buy, Coker's insurance
agency.' 67 The events that followed are instructive. Upon execution of
the agreement, Hunt relocated his agency to Coker's building. Both
Coker and Hunt worked their own accounts, essentially operating separate businesses but sometimes brokering policies together. Over time,
Coker became unhappy with the quality of Hunt's work and informed
68
him the offer to sell would not be honored.
Why would Coker be concerned about selfish behavior by Hunt during this interim period?' 69 Recall that the purchase price agreed upon by
the parties was one of several alternatives, each of which was based on the
percentage of commissions that renewed over five, six, or seven years.
Thus, the sale price of the agency was directly linked to Hunt's nonverifiable efforts. Viewed in this light, the transition period created by the
comfort agreement takes on new meaning. Coker's numerous opportunities to observe Hunt's behavior may have served as a means of screening for a reciprocally fair business partner. Hunt's subsequent shirking
then would have signaled that he was a "selfish" type and that the ultimate sale agreement would not be self-enforcing.
There are two ways that comfort agreements such as the one in Hunt
can function as a screening device. First, the agreement provides opportunities to observe the behavior of the promisor in response to opportunities to reciprocate. This gives the promisee the opportunity to acquire
personal knowledge of the character of the promisor. 170 To be sure,
some promisors may attempt to "act fair" during the interim period and
return to selfish behavior when the future relationship is cemented. But,
in addition to observation, the comfort agreement serves to separate in
166. 741 So. 2d 1011 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
167. See supra text accompanying note 79. "The agreement provided that Hunt
would consolidate his location with Coker as soon as possible with each party paying their
own expenses ... until the date of sale." 741 So. 2d at 1013.
168. Hunt, 741 So. 2d at 1013.
169. There is no evidence of precisely what behavior by Hunt led to Coker's decision
to terminate the relationship. Coker could have been unhappy either because he observed
that Hunt was an incompetent insurance broker or because he observed Hunt shirking.
My point is only that screening for shirking and other selfish behavior is a plausible, and
additional, reason why parties enter into such agreements.
170. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488, 500 (1970).
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time the opportunity to reciprocate from the subsequent transaction that
is ultimately contemplated. It is thus an example of the expenditure of
time for the purposes of communication. 17 1 In this case, potential transactors are not only subject to observation but they must spend considerable time in the process of executing an agreement that is only self-enforcing. 17 2 Since reciprocally fair individuals are able to capture the returns
to general information about their type through an enhanced reputation
for cooperation, they are more willing to spend resources to provide this
information. 173 Much how a person's willingness to wait in a queue for
tickets to an event signals her desire to attend the show, the expenditure
of time performing a nonverifiable promise is itself a signal; in this case it
174
may signal a preference for reciprocity.
In sum, while the available evidence is sufficient only for intelligent
speculation, the sample of litigated cases suggests that the widespread use
of informal comfort agreements may be a function of their properties as
screens for voluntarily cooperative behavior. Parties entering relationships in which measures of performance are nonverifiable will benefit
from personal knowledge of the fairness preferences of their contracting
partners. Such knowledge will permit them to enter transactions in
which key measures of performance are nonverifiable without serious
risk.
B. Should Courts Refuse to Enforce Intentionally Incomplete Agreements?
In the preceding discussion I have argued that the theory of reciprocal fairness significantly expands the domain and the potency of self-en171. A. Michael Spence, Time and Communication in Economic and Social
Interaction, 87 QJ. Econ. 651, 651-52 (1973).
172. Many formal letters of intent indicate explicitly that the parties do not intend to
be legally bound, thus reducing, but not eliminating, the threat of subsequent litigation by
a disappointed promisee. Johnston, supra note 46, at 403-04. None of the informal
comfort agreements in the litigated cases contained a term expressly declining legal
enforcement. It is puzzling why this is so, particularly in those agreements where legal
counsel assisted in the drafting process. One inference is that parties prefer to leave the
question of potential legal enforcement deliberately ambiguous. See supra text
accompanying note 143.
173. Another way of expressing the point in the text is that a selfish party can perhaps
dupe a single promisee and capture a larger surplus but, once her selfish nature is revealed
(the bonus is not paid), she is unable to replicate the transaction at low cost. On the other
hand, a reciprocally fair party will not only earn a portion of the enhanced surplus in this
transaction, but, by revealing her type (the bonus is paid), she will develop a reputation for
fairness that can be exploited at lower cost in future transactions. See Joseph E. Stiglitz,
The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income, 65 Am. Econ. Rev.
283, 287 (1975).
174. For a similar analysis that focuses on psychological phenomena to explain selfselection of trustworthy individuals who opt in to closely-held corporations, see Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of
Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1735, 1803-07 (2001); see also Eric A. Posner, Law and
Social Norms 49-67, 23, 25 (2000) (arguing that gift giving and styles of dress may serve to
signal parties' trustworthiness).
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forcing contracts. But the evidence also shows that self-enforcement does
not achieve first-best efficiency. Given a heterogeneous population of
selfish and fair individuals, the self-sanctions for deterring breach of
promise are imperfect. Thus, a logical question is why shouldn't the legal
system combine reciprocity with legal enforcement? Would it not be
more efficient (and more fair) for courts to fill gaps in intentionally incomplete agreements where the evidence ex post reveals that the transaction broke down (presumably because one of the parties was selfish)?
To make the question concrete, return to the contracting example
of the New York buyer and the Indian seller described above in Part II.C.
Assume that the New York buyer elects the self-enforcing indefinite contract and that the seller delivers goods that are unsatisfactory to the
buyer. The buyer, in turn, declines to pay a bonus. Subsequently, the
buyer sues for breach of contract, seeking rescission and damages, and
the seller counterclaims for a "reasonable" bonus. Should the law seek to
complete this contract for the parties?
To answer this question, a court must select between two distinct approaches to the problem of indefinite agreements. One option is to follow the modern presumption and enforce the agreement notwithstanding the indefinite terms. For example, a court could order a "fair" result
by imposing an equitable adjustment-a reasonable bonus in return for a
reasonable effort-taking all of the contextual factors into account as
they appear at the time of adjudication. 175 This outcome follows from
the premise that these intentionally indefinite contracts create reciprocal
duties and courts should enforce those duties when the parties subsequently cannot agree.176 Alternatively, a court could follow the precedent of the cases from the sample and dismiss both the buyer's claim for
damages and the seller's claim for a reasonable bonus on the grounds of
175. Contract law typically fills such gaps with broad standards of reasonableness
when the conditions for more precise rules are not met. In fact, reasonableness standards
are common because the conditions for creating efficient bright-line default rules are very
difficult to meet. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2.
176. To enforce this agreement, the court must determine what a "reasonable" effort
by the seller would entail and, if that performance is satisfied, what "reasonable" bonus by
the buyer is required. The reasonableness standard thus provides a basis for enforcing
either the additional effort obligations of the seller, the bonus payment obligations of the
buyer, or both. A court might use either an ex ante or an ex post perspective in enforcing
these agreements. If the court simply fills in the gaps ex post, subsequent courts (and
statutory drafters) ideally should not be tempted to reify the result in the particular case as
a default standard. Ex post adjustment, in short, argues for a "black box" style of
decisionmaking. It follows that courts following this approach should be hospitable to
attempts by later parties to alter or eliminate the emergent standard in their contracts.
The ex ante approach aims to create defaults that would be useful to subsequent parties
writing similar agreements. Unfortunately, default standards of reasonableness seldom are
good fits. In the first place, they create moral hazard. Even where the resource costs to the
state are low, such default terms are inefficient to the extent that they specify terms that
condition on unobservable or unverifiable information. To be sure, subsequent parties
can, in theory, reject the state rules and select their own alternatives. But even if opting
out is relatively easy, an inefficient default functions as a "tax" on private contracting.
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indefiniteness. Under this common law approach, the evidence that the
material, verifiable terms were not specified would generate an inference
that the parties did not intend to be legally bound. The claim would be
dismissed, and the losses would lie where they fall.
Which approach is best? At first blush, the robust evidence of reciprocal behavior seems to require that the law acknowledge explicitly the
value of reciprocal fairness. One might argue, for example, that courts
should create default standards of reasonableness to bolster the implicit
patterns of reciprocity that have broken down in this particular instance.17 7 Or, alternatively, one might suggest that, where a contract creates an opportunity for beneficial reciprocity, a court should enforce such
a duty by imposing an equitable adjustment when one of the parties has
78
apparently behaved selfishly.'1
For several reasons, however, the theory of reciprocal fairness supports adherence to the common law indefiniteness doctrine. First, the
prospect of legal enforcement can create a moral hazard risk that may
deter parties from writing self-enforcing agreements. To see why, return
again to the example of the Indian seller and the New York buyer. Assume the parties have chosen the indefinite bonus contract. Now assume
that courts abandon the common law rule on indefiniteness and adopt
the modern presumption of enforcement. This implies that a court will,
with positive probability, entertain a breach of contract claim and try to
decide what is fair. The prospect that the agreement might be legally
enforceable creates an enhanced risk of cheating by the seller. A seller
who produces low quality goods may now threaten to sue for breach of
contract, claiming that she produced high quality goods and was entitled
to a bonus. Since high quality is not verifiable, the buyer faces an enhanced risk of hold-up. The problem is that the legal enforcement rule
itself creates a motive for a seller to claim the right to a bonus payment
for a nonverifiable performance, apart from any assumption that fair sellers will sue because they are angry. Given what a court will do, litigation
can maximize any seller's expected profits and thus make credible the
hold-up threat.
Moreover, if a court will potentially enforce a bonus promise against
the buyer where the seller has, in fact, delivered low quality goods, it no
longer is rational for buyers to offer the intentionally incomplete bonus
agreement.1 79 Thus, the prospect of legal enforcement-and its associ177. See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under LongTerm Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 369, 420-22 (1981) (arguing that court-imposed
price adjustment is preferable to efficient risk allocation).
178. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An
Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 Duke L.J. 1, 4-14.
179. To be sure, a promisee will sometimes expressly agree to a "best efforts" or
"reasonable efforts" contract in which a court may potentially be asked to determine
whether the efforts given by the promisor were "best" or "reasonable." Typically, such
levels of effort will be nonverifiable. But parties generally will choose such broad standards
that condition on nonverifiable factors only where the contract is otherwise structured so
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ated moral hazard risk-may motivate the buyer to abandon the bonus
agreement altogether. This would be an inferior outcome because, as we
have seen, the self-enforcing bonus agreement is socially efficient: High
quality generates a greater surplus than low quality and there is a positive
probability that the contract will generate high quality.
Now consider the alternative: The court denies relief on the
grounds of indefiniteness; it cannot verify whether the seller delivered
high quality goods and thus cannot grant a remedy. The nonenforcement approach eliminates the hold-up threat and restores the buyer's incentive to offer the more efficient self-enforcing bonus contract. In
short, any enforcement rule (or standard) that conditions on nonverifiable factors (such as high quality) will produce an inferior outcome to a
nonenforcement rule that leaves the parties room for reciprocity.
The preceding argument shows that an attempt to enforce deliberately incomplete contracts by adopting a broad standard of reasonableness or good faith is socially inefficient. A further question is whether the
same conclusion holds if courts attempt to limit legal enforcement to the
verifiable terms in agreements that otherwise depend on self-enforcement.
Recall that in the example of the Indian seller and the New York buyer
the parties initially faced a choice between an obligationally complete
contract (merchantable quality goods for a $50,000 price) and an indefinite bonus contract (a $40,000 base price with a bonus of $20,000 in return for the delivery of high quality goods). Now suppose that the parties
reach an agreement that combines the features of both options. The
buyer offers a price of $50,000 with a $10,000 bonus if the seller delivers
high quality goods satisfactory to the buyer. In addition, the contract
specifies that the buyer can recover $10,000 in liquidated damages if the
seller does not provide at least merchantable quality goods. Merchantable quality, recall, is verifiable to a court.' 80 In this example, then, the
parties have agreed to a verifiable obligation that, if severable from the
indefinite bonus, would be legally enforceable. Assume the seller delivers
nonmerchantable goods that do not "pass without objection in the
trade" 81 and the buyer seeks recovery of the stipulated damages. The
seller claims, in turn, that the entire agreement is indefinite and
unenforceable.
It is tempting to suggest that granting a remedy to the buyer in this
instance is socially optimal. After all, this portion of the agreement was
definite and certain. The breach by the seller does not implicate the indefinite promise of a bonus for high quality performance. But the critical
question is whether legal enforcement of the verifiable terms would adversely affect the potency of reciprocity as a means of enforcing the
that the party with discretion has incentives to take both parties' interests into account,
thus obviating the need for courts to evaluate the nonverifiable measures of performance.
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2; Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 164.
180. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
181. U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (a) (2002).
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nonverifiable terms of the agreement. In other words: How do explicit,
legal incentives to abide by the terms of a contract interact with motivations of fairness and reciprocity?
A recent series of experiments by Fehr and Gdchter using a variation
on the Gift Exchange Game examines this question. 18 2 In the control
version of these experiments, buyers offer a trust contract at a stipulated
price and a desired level of effort. If the seller accepts this offer, she is
free to choose her actual level of effort. The higher the level of effort
chosen, the more costly to the seller. In each experimental session there
are eight sellers and six buyers, each of whom can contract with only a
single seller. 183 All participants know that there is an excess supply of
sellers. Thus, in principle, the buyers can enforce very low prices and
selfish sellers have no incentive to provide any effort above the minimum
level. The results, by now predictable, are that many buyers in fact offer
quite generous prices, and many sellers respond with greater efforts, substantially above the selfish choice.1 84 In the second version of the experiment, the buyers are allowed to impose a sanction (e.g., a monetary fine)
if the seller shirks on her effort obligation.1 85 Thus, this version in essence adds the dimension of legal enforcement to the incomplete trust
contractjust described (one might, for example, think of the fine as damages for breach of contract). The results show that the average price offered by buyers and the average effort of sellers is lower in the presence of
explicit, legally enforceable sanctions. Without legal enforcement, reciprocal fairness generates high levels of performance. But once the interaction is backed by legal sanctions, reciprocity declines and overall perform182. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary
Cooperation? (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No.
34, 2002), available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp34.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Fehr & Gachter, Incentive Contracts]. See generally
Fehr & Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 113.
183. Experiments have shown that prices and quality of efforts are the same
regardless of whether the number of sellers is below or above the number of buyers. This
indicates that competition has little or no effect on outcomes in these gift exchange
markets. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, Do Market Conditions Affect Gift Exchange?
Evidence from Experimental Markets with Excess Supply and Excess Demand 14-21, 25
(Instituto de Anilisis Economico, Working Paper No. 522.02, Dec. 2001), available at
http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2002/52202.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
184. In a large field study, Truman Bewley provided empirical evidence supporting
the results of the Fehr and Gachter experiments. See Truman F. Bewley, Why Wages Don't
Fall During a Recession (1999); Truman F. Bewley, A Depressed Labor Market as
Explained by Participants, 85 Am. Econ. Rev. 250 (1995). The managers who were
interviewed stressed that "workers have so many opportunities to take advantage of
employers that it is not wise to depend on coercion and financial incentives alone as
motivators." Id. at 252. Employers believe that other motivators are necessary, which are
best thought of as having to do with generosity. See Fehr & Gachter, Incentive Contracts,
supra note 182, at 11.
185. The probability of verifying shirking is set at one-third and determined by a roll
of the dice. See Fehr & Gachter, Incentive Contracts, supra note 182, at 11.
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ance is reduced. 186 This result suggests that implicit incentives based on
reciprocity and explicit, legally enforceable performance duties may indeed be in conflict with each other. 18 7 In particular, explicit incentives
88
may "crowd out" behavior based on reciprocal fairness.1
The "crowding out" phenomenon observed in the experiments may
seem counterintuitive, particularly since other experiments have shown
that a combination of self-enforcing incentives actually increases contracting efficiency.18 9 Why might reciprocal fairness and repeated interactions be complements while reciprocal fairness and legal enforcement
are substitutes? One conjecture is based on the fact that legal enforcement is structured as a zero-sum game in which the promisee threatens
ex ante to sanction the promisor for subsequent nonperformance. The
explicit, ex ante nature of legal sanctions may thus undermine the instinct
to reciprocate. Fair types may simply regard legal enforcement as unfair
since they are willing to reciprocate voluntarily, while selfish types may
interpret the threat of sanction through legal enforcement as a signal

186. The level of effort by sellers and amount of voluntary cooperation were lower in
the obligationally complete contract because: 1) shirking by sellers increased even where
the expected costs of shirking exceeded the expected returns to the seller; and 2)
reciprocity in the form of generous offers by buyers and reciprocating efforts by sellers
vanished almost completely. Where the expected returns to shirking were positive, sellers
chose the minimum quality in the vast majority of cases, and, when buyers offered more
generous prices above the minimum, sellers did not reciprocate with greater efforts. See
Fehr & Gfchter, Incentive Contracts, supra note 182, at 15-18.
187. Other experiments have also found that combining legal enforcement with
nonlegal mechanisms-such as social norms-can have counterproductive effects. See,
e.g., Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and
Crowding, 95 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 131, 141 (2001) (demonstrating that in contract
enforcement experiment in which probabilities of sanctions for breach are variable, and
propensity to perform is nonmonotonic, performance is higher at both low and high
probability states and lower at intermediate probabilities of enforcement); Uri Gneezy &
Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1, 15-16 (2000) (reporting that
introduction of price incentives for parents who are late picking up their children from
day care increases frequency of late-coming parents). There is also an extensive literature
in social psychology that considers the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic
monetary rewards. See, e.g., Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments
Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 Psychol. Bull. 627
(1999). In this literature the monetary incentive is set exogenously by the experimenter
and not by a principal. Thus, it does not test for reciprocity and voluntary cooperation.
188. The experimental research on crowding out is still in a preliminary stage. In
particular, economists do not know why and under which conditions reciprocity and
voluntary cooperation will be undermined by legal enforcement. Fehr and Gachter have
shown that framing effects influence the crowding out phenomenon. Thus, for example,
the levels of reciprocity are considerably greater if the explicit incentive is framed as a
bonus from a base offer rather than as a fine for nonperformance, even though the
economic effects of the "carrot" are equal to that of the "stick." See Fehr & Cchter,
Incentive Contracts, supra note 182, at 26-30.
189. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing complementarity between reciprocal fairness
and repeated interactions).
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that the promisee is unlikely to be a reciprocator. 9° The same explicit
threat does not exist in the case of repeated interactions where the implicit sanction (terminating the relationship) is imposed ex post after the
shirking has been observed. In that sense, ex post punishment may be
perceived as "fairer" than the ex ante announcement of damages for
breach.
The evidence that voluntary cooperation may be undermined by explicit legal obligations is a further argument in favor of the formalist approach to contract law that has been historically followed by the common
law. The instinct to preserve a space for reciprocal fairness may explain
the common law preference for simple, binary, winner-take-all legal
rules.1 9 1 Within the framework of a few clear rules, parties can respond
to implicit opportunities to behave reciprocally, even in one-shot interactions. Obviously, these effects are magnified in relational settings in
19 2
which parties can "lock in" to a long-term cooperative equilibrium.
Notwithstanding the power of reciprocal fairness, contractual breakdowns nonetheless occur, in part because as the experimental evidence
suggests there is both self-interest and reciprocity in the world. But given
such a world, the puzzle of indefinite contracts may now be solved. Contracting parties simply may have learned to behave under two sets of
rules: an explicit (rigid) set of rules for legal enforcement and an implicit (flexible) set of rules for self-enforcement. It may be that the lesson
for courts is that any effort to judicialize preferences for fairness will destroy the very informality that makes reciprocity so effective in the first
instance.' 9 3, The experimental evidence suggests that the contemporary
academic instinct to have courts fill gaps in incomplete contracts with
broadly applicable standards of reasonableness and fair treatment may
actually undermine the very norms of fairness that the legal system seeks
to advance. If so, it is important that neither courts nor academic commentators generalize about the impotency of reciprocal fairness from the
litigated cases, as these disputes only arise when the implicit incentives
have broken down. Litigated cases, therefore, give no clue of the power
of reciprocal fairness in the many situations where these social prefer190. The story that explains crowding out is based only on intelligent speculation. A
legal sanction is always framed as a threat. To the extent that intentions matter in
motivating reciprocity, the ex ante threat may be interpreted as a hostile intention. A
liquidated damages clause in a contract may thus be perceived as an indication of distrust.
If sellers perceive the damages clause as a hostile act, they may be less willing to put forth
the same quality of efforts as compared to a situation in which the first mover sends a
trusting signal. Fehr & Gachter, Incentive Contracts, supra note 182, at 14.
191. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial
Contracts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 597, 611-15 (1990) [hereinafter Scott, Relational Theory of
Default Rules] (analyzing doctrines of perfect tender, mistake, excuse, and breach as
binary legal rules that assign risks on all-or-nothing basis).
192. Id. at 614; Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra note 10, at 2026.
193. See Scott, Relational Theory of Default Rules, supra note 191, at 615 (making the
complementary point that judicializing extralegal norms will undernine their
effectiveness).
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ences may have been effective in enforcing indefinite agreements, even
between strangers. Understood in the broader context of a system that
relies on both legal enforcement and self-enforcement, the wisdom of the
19 4
common law approach becomes clearer.
CONCLUSION

The doctrine that declares unenforceable an agreement that is uncertain or indefinite in its material terms is a core principle of the common law of contracts. Conventional academic wisdom holds that this
doctrine is an artifact of a discredited legal formalism. It is assumed that
contemporary American courts work to enforce incomplete contracts by
filling gaps with broad standards of reasonableness and good faith. But
in an important class of cases the conventional wisdom is misleading. A
systematic review of this case law shows that courts continue to adhere to
the indefiniteness doctrine, declining to enforce contracts where the parties have intentionally declined to condition performance on verifiable
measures that could have been specified in the agreement at relatively
low cost.
This evidence is puzzling in two distinct respects. First, these intentionally incomplete agreements are inconsistent with the assumptions of
contract theory that contracting parties will discard nonverifiable measures of performance but will contract over low-cost, verifiable measures.
Second, the judicial decisions not to enforce these agreements are inconsistent with the assumption of most contemporary theorists that courts
can (and do) enhance the fairness and efficiency of contractual exchange
by filling contractual gaps whenever possible.
The alternative of self-enforcement is the most plausible explanation
for why parties intentionally write indefinite agreements even in isolated
transactions between relative strangers. Where self-enforcement is effective, it is more efficient than legal enforcement. The traditional understanding is that self-enforcement is limited to contexts where reputation
or repeated interactions are sufficient to make promises credible. Recent
work in experimental economics suggests, however, that reciprocal fairness is a potent additional means of self-enforcement. Whether reciprocal fairness is a learned behavior that derives from the benefits of cooperation in repeated interactions or an intrinsic motivation remains an open
question. But the important point is that the evidence suggests that the
domain of self-enforcing contracts extends to environments in which a
reputation for trustworthiness and the discipline of ongoing relationships
are relatively weak forces. Intentionally incomplete contracts of the sort
194. Id. at 614-15. The formal contract law that has survived the common law process
serves as an effective complement to the more flexible mechanism of reciprocal fairness.

Any effort to expand the law by adopting broad legal standards requiring "reasonable"
behavior and/or "fair treatment" may (perversely) crowd out the opportunities for implicit

enforcement through reciprocity.
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routinely dismissed by courts have a common feature: The agreements
are simple in form, clear in commitment, and structured to create opportunities for parties to reciprocate in ways that expand the contractual
195
surplus.
One of the robust findings of the fairness experiments is that we live
in a heterogeneous world in which a significant fraction of individuals
behave as if they are reciprocally fair and a comparable fraction respond
only to self-interest. This phenomenon of heterogeneity provides an explanation for another category of intentionally incomplete agreements.
Parties commonly write informal "agreements to agree" (what I have
termed "comfort agreements"). Among other purposes, these agreements can function as means of screening for reciprocally fair business
partners by providing an opportunity for each party to observe the
other's character over time.
Legal analysts have a further concern: Should courts intervene to
enforce these indefinite agreements when reciprocity fails? The answer
to this legal policy question depends on whether legal enforcement is a
complement to, or a substitute for, self-enforcement through reciprocity.
The available evidence suggests that legally enforcing these troublesome
agreements may be counterproductive. If courts use general standards of
fairness to enforce nonverifiable promises, parties will abandon this form
of agreement. Even where courts only enforce the verifiable promises in
these agreements, there is some evidence that any judicial intervention
crowds out the instinct to reciprocate. To the extent this is true, legal
enforcement will have negative effects in reducing the potency of reciprocal fairness in the great majority of cases where self-enforcement is currently effective.
The evidence that legal sanctions and voluntary cooperation may be
incompatible both explains and justifies the determination of contemporary courts to police strictly the boundary between the two domains. Perhaps the puzzle of deliberately incomplete contracts is only a conundrum
for academic lawyers, whose occupational hazard is to assume that without law there is no social order. Contrary to that conventional assumption, there are strong reasons to believe that fairness matters, and because of those reasons the law should leave space for reciprocity to work.
195. The key features of these agreements-simplicity and moral clarity-may best
explain how parties can tell whether they are in a legally enforceable environment, where
fairness is crowded out, or a self-enforcing environment, where reciprocity has room to
function. Where transactions are complex and the respective promises interrelated, a
failure to perform a promise may not be obvious and thus reciprocity may not serve to
make the promises credible. Given the highly interactive nature of the obligations of each
party to a complex transaction, it may be difficult to know, for example, whether one
party's refusal to respond cooperatively in a particular case represents unfair or selfish
behavior or an appropriately measured retaliatory response to an earlier instance of
noncooperation by the other. These complex interactions are the sorts of agreements that
commercial parties typically reduce to legally enforceable obligations. Scott, Conflict and
Cooperation, supra note 10, at 2050-51.
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TABLE 1:
ENFORCEABLE INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
Type of 19 6
Transaction

Parties

19 7

State

Case Citation

Cal.

Denver D. Darling, Inc. v. Controlled
Environments Construction, Inc., 108
Cal. Rptr. 2d 213 (Ct. App. 2001)

Relational

Closely-Held Firm v.
Closely-Held Firm

Cal.

Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C.,
107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (Ct. App.
2001)

Relational

Individual v. Large
Firm

Conn.

Detroit Institute of Arts Founders
Society v. Rose, 127 F. Supp. 2d 117
(D. Conn. 2001)

Relational

Large Firm v.
Individual

Conn.

Bartomeli v. Bartomeli, 783 A.2d

Relational

Individual v. Individual

1050 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001)

Conn.

Willow Funding Co. v. Grencom
Associates, 779 A.2d 174 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2001)

Relational

Large Firm v. Large
Firm

D.C.

Howell v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl.
516 (2002)

Relational

Closely-Held Firm v.
Large Firm

D.C.

Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. v.
Barram, 226 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.

Relational

Large Firm v. Large
Firm

D.C.

Affordable Elegance Travel, Inc. v.
Worldspan, L.P., 774 A.2d 320 (D.C.

Relational

Large Firm v. Large
Firm

Ga.

Quadron Software International
Corp. v. Plotseneder, 568 S.E.2d 178

Relational

Large Firm v.
Individual

Ga.

Jones v. Hill, 539 S.E.2d 893 (Ga. Ct.

Relational

Individual v. Individual

2000)

2001)

(Ga. Ct. App. 2002)
App. 2000)

Ga.

Kueffer Crane & Hoist Service, Inc.
v. Passarella, 543 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2000)

Relational

Large Firm v.
Individual

Ga.

Tattersall Club Corp. v. White, 501
S.E.2d 851 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)

Relational

Large Firm v.
Individual

Idaho

Kohring v. Robertson, 44 P.3d 1149
(Idaho 2002)

Relational

Individual v.
Closely-Held Firm

Idaho

General Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine
Parts Co., 979 P.2d 1207 (Idaho

Relational

Large Firm v. Large
Firm

Ill.

Raskas Foods, Inc. v. Southwest
Whey, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. Ct.

Relational

Large Firm v. Large
Firm

1999)

I

_

App. 1998)

196. Transactions are characterized as either relational or discrete indicating the
extent to which the parties are (or were) in ongoing relationships rather than isolated or
one-shot exchange transactions.
197. Parties are coded as either individuals, closely-held firms (e.g., sole
proprietorships, most partnerships, and closely-held corporations) or large firms (e.g.,
public corporations, limited partnerships, and professional partnerships).
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(CONT'D):

ENFORCEABLE INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS

State

Type of'
Transactin

Case Citation

Parties

Ind.

McLinden v. Coco, 765 N.E.2d 606
(Ind.Ct. App. 2002)

Relational

Closely-Held Firm v.
Closely-Held Firm

Iowa

Helm Financial Corp. v. Iowa
Northern Railway, Co., 214 F.Supp.
2d 934 (N.D. Iowa 2002)
Gallagher, Langlas & Gallagher v.
Burco, 587 N.W.2d 615 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1998)

Relational

Large Firm v. Large
Firm

Md.

Giannaris v. Cheng, 219 F. Supp. 2d
687 (D. Md. 2002)

Relational

Individual v. Individual

Md.

Lacy v. Arvin, 780 A.2d 1180 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2001)
Swartz v. Schering-Plough Corp., 53 F.
Supp. 2d 95 (D. Mass. 1999)
American Laminates, Inc. v. J.S. Latta
Co., 980 S.W.2d 12 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998)

Relational

Individual v. Individual

Relational

Individual v. Large
Firm
Large Firm v. Large
Firm

N.J.

D & N Property Management &
Development Corp. v. Copeland Cos.,
127 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

Relational

Large Firm v. Large
Firm

N.Y.

Gonzalez v. Don King Productions,
Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y.
1998)

Relational

Individual v.
Closely-Held Firm

N.Y.

Non-Linear Trading Co. v. Braddis
Associates, Inc., 675 N.Y.S.2d 5 (App.
Div. 1998)

Relational

Large Firm v. Large
Firm

Ohio

DeBoer Structures (U.S.A.) Inc. v.
Shaffer Tent & Awning Co., 233 F.
Supp. 2d 934 (S.D. Ohio 2002)
Nilavar v. Osborn, 738 N.E.2d 1271

Relational

Large Firm v. Large
Firm

Relational

Individual v. Individual

Iowa

Mass.
Mo.

Ohio

Relational

Large Firm v.
Individual

Relational

(Ohio Ct. App. 2000)

Ohio

Vargo v. Clark, 716 N.E.2d 238 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1998)

Relational

Individual v. Individual

Okla.

McCurdy Group, L.L.C. v. American
Biomedical Group, Inc., 9 Fed. Appx.
822 (10th Cir. 2001)
ATACS Corp. v. Trans World
Communications, Inc., 155 F.3d 659

Relational

Large Firm v. Large
Firm

Relational

Large Firm v. Large
Firm

Relational

Individual v. Individual

Pa.

(3d Cir. 1998)

Tenn.

Davidson v. Holtzman, 47 S.W.3d 445
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)

Tex.

Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent
Technologies, Inc., 302 F.3d 552 (5th
Cir. 2002)

Relational

Large Firm v. Large
Firm

Tex.

Esquenazi v. Sardar, No. DV98-07269E, 2002 WL 519684 (Tex. Ct. App.

Relational

Large Firm v.
Individual

V.I.

Morton v. Hewitt, 202 F. Supp. 2d

Apr. 8, 2002)
394 (D.VI. 2002)

Relational
1

Individual v. Individual
1
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TABLE 2:
19 8
UNENFORCEABLE INDEFINITE AGREEMENTS

Parties

Type of
Agreement

Relational

Individual v.
Large Firm

Indefinite
bonus contract

Suffield Development Associates v. Society for Savings, 708
A.2d 1361 (Conn. 1998)

Discrete

Large Firm v.
Large Firm

Comfort
agreement

Conn.

111 Whitney Ave., Inc. v. Commissioner of Mental Retardation, 802 A.2d 117 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2002)

Discrete

Closely-Held
Firm v. Large
Firm

Indefinite
bonus contract

Conn.

Coady v. Martin, 784 A.2d 897
(Conn. App. Ct. 2001)

Discrete

Individual v.
Individual

Comfort
agreement

Colo.

National Mortgage Corp. v.
Greenwich Capital Financial
Products, Inc., 53 Fed. Appx.
510 (10th Cir. 2002)

Relational

Large Firm v.
Large Firm

Deliberately
incomplete
(end-game)

Colo.

DiFrancesco v. Particle Interconnect Corp., 39 P.3d 1243
(Colo. Ct. App. 2001)

Relational

Closely-Held
Firm v. Large
Firm

Agreement to
agree (settlement)

Fla.

University Creek Associates II,
Ltd. v. Boston American
Financial Group, Inc., 100 F.
Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 1998)

Discrete

Large Firm v.
Large Firm

Comfort
agreement

Fla.

Bergman v. Delulio, 826 So.
2d 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002)

Discrete

Individual v.
Individual

Comfort
agreement

Ga.

OfficeMax, Inc. v. Sapp, 132 F.
Supp. 2d 1079 (M.D. Ga.
2001)

Discrete

Large Firm v.
Closely-Held
Firm

Letter of intent

Ga.

Zurich American Insurance
Co. v. General Car & Truck
Leasing System, Inc., 574
S.E.2d 914 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002)

Discrete

Large Firm v.
Large Firm

Inadvertence

Ga.

Aukerman v. Witmer, 568
S.E.2d 123 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002)

Relational

Individual v.
Individual

Deliberately
incomplete

Ga.

Bulloch South, Inc. v. Gosai,
550 S.E.2d 750 (Ga. Ct. App.
2001)

Discrete

Closely-Held
Firm v. Individual

Inadvertence

Ga.

Burns v. Dees, 557 S.E.2d 32
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001)

Relational

Individual v.
Individual

Indefinite
bonus contract

State

Case Citation

Cal.

Halvorsen v. Aramark Uniform
Services, Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d
383 (Ct. App. 1998)

Conn.

Type of
Transaction

198. Cases are coded by state, type of transaction, and nature of parties as in table 1.
In addition, the cases are coded by "Type of Agreement": inadvertently incomplete
agreement, deliberately incomplete agreement, indefinite bonus agreement, general
agreement to agree, comfort agreement, formal letter of intent, sales contract, and
indefinite non-compete clause.
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State

Case Citation

Type of
Transaction

Parties

Type of
Agreement

-

Ga.

Mooney v. Mooney, 538 S.E.2d
864 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)

Discrete

Individual v.
Individual

Indefinite
bonus contract

Ga.

Faulkner v. Hood, 539 S.E.2d
886 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)

Discrete

Individual v.
Individual

Indefinite
bonus contract

Ga.

Gill v. B & R International,
Inc., 507 S.E.2d 477 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1998)

Relational

Individual v.
Large Firm

Indefinite
bonus contract

Ill.

Brines v. XTRA Corp., 304
F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2002)

Relational

Individual v.
Large Firm

Deliberately
incomplete

Ill.

Wilkes v. AccuStaff, Inc., 42 F.
Supp. 2d 842 (N.D. Ill. 1999)

Relational

Individual v.
Large Firm

Indefinite
bonus contract

Ind.

Mays v. Trump Indiana, Inc.,
255 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 2001)

Discrete

Individual v.
Large Firm

Agreement to
agree

Ind.

Don Webster Co. v. Indiana
Western Express, Inc., 161 F.
Supp. 2d 959 (S.D. Ind. 2001)

Relational

Large Firm v.
Large Firm

Indefinite
bonus contract

Iowa

Schaller Telephone Co. v.
Golden Sky Systems, Inc., 298
F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2002)

Discrete

Large Firm v.
Large Firm

Agreement to
agree

Kan.

Sprint Corp. v. DeAngelo, 12
F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D. Kan.
1998)

Discrete

Large Firm v.
Individual

Indefinite noncompete clause

Ky.

Auto Channel, Inc. v. Speedvision Network, LLC, 144 F.
Supp. 2d 784 (W.D. Ky. 2001)

Discrete

Closely-Held
Firm v. Large
Firm

Agreement to
agree

Me.

Larson v. Johnson, 184 F.
Supp. 2d 26 (D. Me. 2002)199

Relational

Individual v.
Individual

Indefinite
bonus contract

Md.

Doe v. Doe, 712 A.2d 132
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998)

Relational

Individual v.
Individual

Indefinite
bonus contract

Minn.

Richie Co. v. Lyndon Insurance Group, Inc., 316 F.3d
758 (8th Cir. 2002)

Relational

Closely-Held
Firm v. CloselyHeld Firm

Comfort
agreement

Miss.

Hunt v. Coker, 741 So. 2d
1011 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)

Discrete

Individual v.
Individual

Comfort
agreement

Mo.

Smith v. Hammons, 63 S.W.3d
320 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)

Discrete

Individual v.
Individual

Indefinite
bonus contract

Neb.

Cheloha v. Cheloha, 582
N.W.2d 291 (Neb. 1998)

Discrete

Individual v.
Individual

Indefinite
bonus contract

Relational
Jalor Color Graphics, Inc. v.
Knoll Pharmaceutical Co., 26
Fed. Appx. 38 (2d Cir. 2001) 1

Large Firm v.
Large Firm

Indefinite
bonus contract

N.Y.

1

1

1

199. Summary judgment for defendant was denied on the grounds that plaintiffs
claim for wages at his earlier rate presented a jury question.
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(CONT'D):
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State
N.Y.

Case CiUttion
Wechsler v. Hunt Health Systems, Ltd., 186 F. Supp. 2d

Type of
Transaction

Parties

Type of
Agreement

Discrete

Large Firm v.
Large Firm

Deliberately
incomplete

Relational

Individual v.
Large Firm

Agreement to
agree

402 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)

N.Y.

Missigman v. USI Northeast,
Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 495

N.Y.

Sugerman v. MCY Music
World, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d
316 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

Discrete

Individual v.
Closely-Held
Firm

Indefinite
bonus contract

N.Y.

Gorodensky v. Mitsubishi Pulp
Sales (MC), Inc., 92 F. Supp.
2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

Discrete

Large Firm v.
Large Firm

Letter of intent

N.Y.

Cleveland Wrecking Co. v.
Hercules Construction Corp.,
23 F. Supp. 2d 287 (E.D.N.Y.

Discrete

Closely-Held
Firm v. CloselyHeld Firm

Agreement to
agree

(S.D.N.Y. 2001)

1998)

N.Y.

Lowinger v. Lowinger, 733
N.Y.S.2d 33 (App. Div. 2001)

Relational

Individual v.
Individual

Indefinite
bonus contract

N.Y.

F & K Supply, Inc. v. Willowbrook Development Co., 732
N.Y.S.2d 734 (App. Div. 2001)

Discrete

Closely-Held
Firm v. CloselyHeld Firm

Settlement
agreement

N.Y.

Robert Plan Corp. v. Perot Systems Corp., 718 N.Y.S.2d 50
(App. Div. 2000)

Discrete

Closely-Held
Firm v. Individhal

Deliberately
incomplete

N.Y.

Strauss Paper Co. v. RSA Executive Search, Inc., 688

Discrete

Large Firm v.
Large Firm

Inadvertence

N.Y.S.2d 641 (App. Div. 1999)

N.C.

Miller v. Rose, 532 S.E.2d 228
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000)

Discrete

Individual v.
Individual

Comfort
agreement

N.D.

Stout v. Fisher Industries, Inc.,
603 N.W.2d 52 (N.D. 1999)

Discrete

Individual v.
Closely-Held
Firm

Comfort
agreement

Ohio

Ullmo ex rel. Ullmo v. Gilmour Academy, 273 F.3d 671
(6th Cir. 2001)

Discrete

Individual v
Closely-Held
Firm

Deliberately
incomplete

Ohio

Kostelnik v. Helper, 770
N.E.2d 58 (Ohio 2002)

Discrete

Individual v.
Individual

Inadvertence

Ohio

Allied Erecting & Dismantling
Co. v. Uneco Realty Co., 765
N.E.2d 420 (Ohio Ct. App.

Discrete

Closely-Held
Firm v. CloselyHeld Firm

Indefinite
bonus contract

Relational

Individual v.

Indefinite

Large Firm

bonus contract

2001)

Okla.

Vice v. Conoco, Inc., 150 F.3d
1286 (10th Cir. 1998)

Pa.

Aircraft Guaranty Corp. v.
Strato-Lift, Inc., 103 F. Supp.
2d 830 (E.D. Pa. 2000)

Discrete

Large Firm v.
Large Firm

Sales contract

S.D.

Estate of Fisher v. Fisher, 645
N.W.2d 841 (S.D. 2002)

Relational

Individual v.
Individual

Comfort
agreement
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state

Case Citation

Tenn.

Doe v. HCA Health Services of
Tennessee, Inc., 46 S.W.3d

Tex.

In re United States Brass
Corp., 277 B.R. 326 (Bankr.

Type of
Trnsaction

Parties

Type of
Agreement~

Discrete

Individual v.
Large Firm

Deliberately
Incomplete

Discrete

Individual v.
Large Firm

Inadvertence

191 (Tenn. 2001)

E.D. Tex. 2002)

Tex.

Fort Worth Independent
School District v. City of Fort
Worth, 22 S.W.3d 831 (Tex.
2000)

Relational

Large Firm v.
Large Firm

Comfort
agreement

Tex.

Oakrock Exploration Co. v.
Killam, 87 S.W.3d 685 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2002)

Discrete

Closely-Held
Firm v. Individual

Agreement to
agree

Tex.

John Wood Group USA, Inc.
v. ICO, Inc., 26 S.W.3d 12

Discrete

Large Firm v.
Large Firm

Letter of intent

(Tex. Ct. App. 2000)

Utah

Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v.
Pride Stables, 224 F.3d 1195
(10th Cir. 2000)

Discrete

Large Firm v.
Closely-Held
Firm

Comfort
agreement

Va.

Beazer Homes Corp. v. VMIF/
Anden Southbridge Venture,
235 F. Supp. 2d 485 (E.D. Va.

Discrete

Closely-Held
Firm v. Individual

Letter of intent

Wis.

Chirichillo v. Prasser, 30 F.
Supp. 2d 1132 (E.D. Wis.

Discrete

Individual v.
Individual

Indefinite
bonus contract

2002)
1998)

